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About this publication 
The Business Council of Australia brings together the CEOs of Australia’s largest companies to 
promote economic growth for the benefit of the nation.  
This paper, Improving Australia’s Regulatory System, sets out recommendations and priority 
actions aimed at creating a more efficient regulatory system in Australia. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Major findings and recommendations 
 This paper addresses the key actions that need to be taken to realise a more efficient regulatory 
system in Australia. It builds on the Business Council of Australia’s Standards for Rule Making, 
released last year, which outlined the BCA’s expectations of the characteristics of a high-
performing regulatory system. 
 Australia’s regulatory system may be relatively well evolved and sophisticated on some 
measures, but this does not mean that it delivers efficient regulatory outcomes at all times. 
Australia has well-established regulatory institutions and mechanisms such as the Regulation 
Impact Statement (RIS), but they are not being used to their full potential in creating an efficient 
regulatory system. 
 More and more, governments are resorting to new regulation to solve problems, often without a 
detailed understanding of what the problem is, or with false confidence that regulation is the 
best means of addressing the problem.  
 Australia also has a large existing stock of regulation, much of which is inefficient and remains 
largely untackled despite attempts at reform. It is also continuing to grow. At last count Australia 
had well over half a million pages of regulation and the federal government over the last decade 
has introduced around 6,000 pages of new legislation on average each year.  
 Just as governments are increasingly resorting to new regulation, their compliance with due 
process has been lacklustre. This is most acute for the biggest regulations impacting our whole 
economy at the Commonwealth level – fewer than half of which in a number of recent years 
were subject to Regulation Impact Statements before their introduction. 
 This increasing build-up of new regulation has been accompanied by rapid growth in the 
resources of many regulators, with some major Commonwealth regulators growing faster than 
the budget and the economy over the last decade. Despite increasing resources and influence, 
the public accountability framework for regulators remains largely unchanged.  
Priority actions 
In tackling these challenges, we are cognisant of the importance of not spreading efforts on 
regulatory reform too thinly, and would prefer to see the Commonwealth Government take up a 
tightly focused regulatory reform agenda and implement it rigorously so that the full benefits of 
reform are experienced on the ground by business.  
For this reason, we believe there are four actions that should be implemented as a matter of 
priority: 
1. Make the preparation of Regulation Impact Statements a mandatory legislative 
requirement for regulations. 
− This should cover significant regulations. Exemptions from this requirement should be 
limited to issues of national security and emergency, and be strictly enforced by the Office 
of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) and ministers. 
− If the Regulation Impact Statement process is to work, then all ministers must be fully 
committed to properly understanding and testing with stakeholders the nature and quantity 
of regulatory impacts before making decisions. 
2. Implement a new performance and accountability code for all major regulators in 
omnibus legislation. Such legislation should include provision for: 
− The establishment of an Inspector-General of Regulation to provide additional oversight of 
regulators, including undertaking biennial performance audits of major regulators and 
responding to systemic issues identified by the public and the business community. Such a 
body could be established within the Productivity Commission with a clear mandate to take 
active steps to improve regulator performance and recommend the streamlining of 
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regulation where it is impeding the efficiency of regulators and placing unnecessary costs 
on regulated parties. 
− A balanced performance reporting framework around regulator performance should assess 
not only the enforcement and compliance activities of regulators but the extent to which 
these are undertaken efficiently. 
− Regulators to prepare annual ‘Statements of Accountability’ that outline the basis for 
measuring the success of the regulator, in agreement with the portfolio minister and the 
Inspector-General of Regulation. 
− Regulators to establish public targets on streamlining their processes to reduce regulatory 
burden each year. 
− Regulators to document, regularly update and adhere to a risk-based approach to 
compliance and enforcement activities. 
3. Require all new regulations that will result in a significant increase in regulatory burden, 
to have an equivalent offsetting red tape reduction within the same portfolio.  
− It may take some time for governments to establish both a meaningful and workable 
offsetting regime. Therefore, less sophisticated interim measures such as ‘one in, one out’ 
within the same portfolio may have to be employed to ameliorate the bias 
towards increasing the stock of regulation. 
4. Introduce productivity payments from the Commonwealth to the states in order to 
encourage regulatory improvement and efficiency.  
− Payments should target and reward state-led regulatory reform in areas of significance to 
the national economy and involving multiple levels of government regulators. This should 
not impact the budget position in the short term, given that payments should be linked to 
outcomes rather than outputs. 
Other recommendations 
The BCA is also making a number of other recommendations for governments to adopt in 
improving the efficiency of the regulatory system. 
Stopping the flow of poor-quality regulation 
5. The Commonwealth Government should publish a government risk policy that sets out clearly 
the criteria and approach it will take in determining if and how it will intervene to manage 
particular risks faced by the community.  
Performance and accountability of regulators 
6. The Commonwealth Government should publish consolidated information on the resources of 
its regulators on an annual basis, including how they are funded. 
7. The Auditor-General, in updating the Australian National Audit Office’s (ANAO’s) Guide to 
Administering Regulation, should include guidance on the appropriate role of regulators in 
relation to policy and regulation making.  
− It should outline how regulations, procedures and guidance should be developed and 
monitored to ensure that it does not encroach on policymaking that is rightfully the role of 
the executive arm of government. 
8. The Office of Parliamentary Counsel, in collaboration with the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, should issue guidance to policymakers and legislative drafters. This guidance 
should have regard to the appropriate constraints that should be placed on the regulation-
making role of regulators when drafting such roles into legislation. 
9. The Commonwealth Government should extend the Office of Parliamentary Counsel’s 
‘Complexity Flag System’ to cover existing legislation in addition to legislation being drafted.  
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− This would allow regulated parties, courts and regulators to identify and report existing 
areas of legislation that are complex and uncertain and that are driving unnecessary resort 
to courts and other formal mechanisms. Interim and longer-term actions to resolve these 
complexities could then be devised. 
Reducing the stock of poor regulation  
10. Extend the Productivity Commission’s annual benchmarking and regulatory burden review 
programs by establishing rolling audits of the cumulative regulatory burden in each industry 
sector at least every five years.  
11. Undertake a stocktake of – and implement, as appropriate – all of the 155 recommendations 
from the Productivity Commission’s annual reviews of regulatory burden that were undertaken 
from 2007 to 2011. 
12. Regularly refresh and streamline the regulatory stock by better targeting existing review and 
sunsetting requirements: 
12.1 Extend sunsetting requirements to primary legislation where it has a significant impact 
and it is practicable to subject it to a full remaking every 10 years. 
12.2 All primary legislation and legislative instruments that have highly significant or uncertain 
impacts on business and the community should be subject to statutory review every five 
years.  
13. In introducing productivity payments to the states in order to encourage regulatory 
improvement, the first round of competitive funding bids should target reforms to planning and 
zoning, environmental assessment and approval, and retail sector regulation. 
14. The Commonwealth Government should commission a study to quantify the cumulative 
compliance burden of corporate governance regulation in Australia.  
− This would provide policymakers with a better understanding of the existing regulatory 
burden from corporate governance regulation before introducing new requirements. It 
would also provide a strong basis for targeting areas of regulation for streamlining. 
15. The Commonwealth Government should pursue a number of immediate changes to the 
Fair Work Act that aim to foster greater flexibility and innovation and constrain business costs. 
These changes would include:  
− reducing the range of matters that can be bargained over 
− providing access to employer‐only greenfield agreements 
− enhancing the capacity to agree flexibility arrangements with employees including through 
individual flexibility arrangements 
− limiting access to protected industrial action where there has been unreasonable or 
capricious use of such action 
− make unlawful clauses which exclude the engagement of contractors or labour hire 
companies 
− modify the “better off overall test” to provide for a broadening of matters that may be taken 
into account in the application of the test. 
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Context 
One of the key underpinnings of any country’s competitive success internationally is the efficiency 
of its regulatory system. Having a well-targeted regulatory system can help markets operate more 
efficiently and help businesses to compete more effectively. Poorly designed and administered 
regulation holds back our performance. 
Regulation has an important role to play in upholding critical rights and providing legitimate 
safeguards, but to be effective regulation must be properly thought-through and applied sensibly.  
There is no escaping the fact that efforts by business to comply with unnecessary or poorly 
designed and administered regulation simply displace productive wealth-generating activities like 
innovation and investment in new technology. Poor regulation also frustrates attempts by 
companies to lower costs and reorganise their operations in response to competitive pressures and 
structural transition that is occurring through the economy. Regulatory delays can be a major 
deterrent to investment and add to the costs of major projects. 
Until recently it has been easy to paper over the economic impact of the burden of regulation, with 
world demand for our natural resources seeing an incredible boost to our terms of trade and 
national incomes. 
However, with the terms of trade down over the past year, pressures on the competitiveness of 
Australian goods, and a continuing stagnation of multifactor productivity growth, some of our 
advantages are fading. 
With the Australian economy facing new competitive pressures, innovation in particular will be the 
key to creating new forms of wealth. Whether we are able to respond to these pressures will 
depend on the capacity of business to change and adapt quickly to make the most of new 
opportunities. Today, however, this flexibility is curtailed by the amount of red tape that must be 
negotiated and which causes delays and increases the costs of developing and implementing 
innovative new ideas. 
There has been some nominal progress in regulatory reform in recent years , including the 
Seamless National Economy reforms. However, such reforms have failed to make much headway 
on the ground. The impacts of such reforms have been overwhelmed by the substantial stock of 
existing regulatory burden still to be tackled, the increasing burden of new regulation and the 
increasing intervention of many of Australia’s regulators. 
This has left Australia less competitive than it should be – ranking 128th out of 148 nations on the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index for regulatory burden. 
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Australia’s regulatory environment: key facts 
 Australia has a substantial stock of regulation: At last count, Australia had well over 
half a million pages of regulation and 24,000 different licences across the country. 
 We are introducing more and more new regulations each year: In 2011, the federal 
government introduced just over 7,000 new pages of legislation. Over the last decade the 
federal parliament has introduced over 6,000 pages of new rules each year. 
 
Source: Deloitte Access Economics, Reforming Australia’s Regulatory Culture, unpublished, 2011. 
 Increasing regulation is placing pressure on Australia’s competitiveness: By 
some measures, Australia’s competitiveness on regulatory burden is slipping. The 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index ranks Australia 128th out of 
148 nations for regulatory burden, down 32 places from 2012. 
 Significant new regulations are often not subject to due process: The Productivity 
Commission has found that in a number of recent years, less than 40 per cent of federal 
government regulations with highly significant impacts were subject to regulatory impact 
analysis.  
 Governments often do not have a proper appreciation of the costs of new 
regulation: A Productivity Commission assessment of sample Regulation Impact 
Statements found that only a third provided quantification of costs for at least some of the 
impacts of the new regulation. 
 There is a worrying lack of belief in good regulatory processes in government: 
In 2012, the Borthwick–Milliner review found that ministers and agencies viewed the 
process of regulatory scrutiny with “evident hostility”, seeing it as “unnecessary red tape 
on government”. 
 The resources of key regulators are also growing rapidly: The BCA has found that 
expenditure by key economic regulators like the ACCC and ASIC has grown faster than 
the overall budget and economy in the last decade. Employment at these regulators has 
also outpaced employment growth in the wider economy over the last decade. 
 Significant overlap and duplication of regulation across levels of government 
imposes even further costs: It has been estimated that recent reforms targeting 
17 areas of overlap and duplication will yield business cost reductions of $4 billion a year. 
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Five principles of a high-performing regulatory system 
This paper builds on the BCA’s Standards for Rule Making released in late 2012, which outlined 
the BCA’s expectations of the characteristics of a high-performing regulatory system. These 
expectations are based on five principles that: 
1. The problem to be solved by regulation is well understood. 
2. New regulation is subject to cost–benefit analysis. 
3. Regulation achieves its objectives at least cost. 
4. Regulators perform efficiently. 
5. Regulation is constantly reviewed. 
There has been a substantial body of work undertaken on regulation-making processes and areas 
of entrenched red tape that exists at all levels of government. For example, the Productivity 
Commission’s annual programs of benchmarking and reviewing regulatory burdens have produced 
155 recommendations since 2007.1 
The approach of this paper is not to revisit this past work, but to highlight priority areas of our 
regulatory system that are underperforming and in need of reform – either because they have not 
been a strong focus of the existing body of work or have not been taken up by governments. 
The paper aims to provide constructive suggestions on how federal and state governments can 
more closely align regulatory systems with best practice regulatory benchmarks. It does this by: 
• Outlining actions that can be taken to stop the flow of poor regulation. 
• Analysing current gaps in the performance and accountability framework that governs regulators 
and outlining actions to address these gaps. 
• Outlining actions to reduce the current stock of poor regulation, by identifying mechanisms and 
priority areas of overly burdensome regulation and identifying those in need of reform, along with 
actions to address these areas. 
Stopping the flow of poor regulation 
There has been substantive work completed on regulatory gate-keeping processes recently, 
including the Borthwick–Milliner review of the regulatory impact analysis (RIA) process, the 
Productivity Commission’s benchmarking of RIA processes, and the BCA’s Standards for 
Rule Making.  
We believe that the reform proposals to be implemented are broadly the right ones, but will 
ultimately require a major rethink in the way in which ministers and agencies commit to and engage 
with the process of regulatory scrutiny. There are further actions that must be taken to extend and 
complement these recent reviews. 
Disciplined application of Regulation Impact Statements 
As the OECD has long suggested, the application of regulatory impact analysis can fluctuate with 
political commitment and pose serious problems for the quality of regulation. This is particularly the 
case where the requirement to undertake Regulation Impact Statements is only an administrative 
requirement, as it is for the Commonwealth Government. 
The Borthwick–Milliner review considered the case for giving greater legal status to the 
requirement to undertake a Regulation Impact Statement. It was of the view that mandating it in 
this way was not the preferred approach and should be considered as a last resort if the current 
arrangements cannot be made to work more effectively and consistently. 
 
1. BCA calculations based on information obtained from the Productivity Commission website. 
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Since 2008–09 there have been 135 instances of non-compliance or exemption that have occurred 
in the Regulation Impact Statement process.2 Over 70 per cent of these relate to non-compliance.3 
Improving the culture of compliance with Regulation Impact Statements requires a step change at 
the Commonwealth level through a commitment that will endure changes of government and 
changes at the senior levels of the public service.  
We therefore recommend that the government institute a legislative mandate requiring the 
preparation of Regulation Impact Statements with only limited exceptions. The requirement should 
apply to any regulation with a significant impact on business or the community, with the exception 
of regulation to address a genuine emergency situation, critical national security issue or urgent 
community safety issue which cannot be addressed in absence of immediate regulation.  
The case for legislation would appear far stronger than many other areas that are being legislated 
and it appears that it would likely pass a cost–benefit test and stand up to the scrutiny of regulatory 
impact analysis itself. For example, a recent study undertaken in Victoria showed that for every 
dollar invested in regulatory impact analysis, there was a return of $28 to $56 in avoided regulatory 
costs to the community.4 Legislated requirements already apply to subordinate legislation in many 
of Australia’s eastern states, and the number of OECD countries legislating the requirement has 
tripled in recent years.5 
 
Risk-based approach to regulation 
Regulatory proposals often enter the system even if regulation is not the most effective mechanism 
to manage the risk. This can result in an over-reaction to the perceived problem at hand and place 
a major cost on the community without addressing the underlying risk in the most sustainable 
manner. 
This comes about because the community and policymakers rarely define acceptable risk, nor 
analyse who is best placed to reduce risk or assess the costs of reducing risk, before proposing 
regulation as the solution. 
It would be useful to develop a central policy on risk management for the government to apply to all 
its policymaking. Such a policy would acknowledge that eliminating all risk is simply unattainable 
and undesirable and instead establish that policy interventions to manage risk should be targeted 
on those “most at risk”. It would also commit government to using regulation or other government 
interventions only in instances where these mechanisms are the optimum solution for managing 
risk.  
A government risk policy should set up more realistic expectations of the role of government and 
regulation in managing risk. It would provide a powerful anchor for government in making decisions 
around whether or not to regulate and communicating these to the public consistently. 
 
2. OBPR, Australian Government Regulation Impact Statement Status – by Agency 2012–13, p.1. Total number includes 
all instances of non-compliance at decision-making and transparency stage as well as exemptions.  
3. ibid. 
4. S. Abusah & C. Pingiaro, 2011, Cost-effectiveness of Regulatory Impact Assessment in Victoria – Staff Working Paper, 
2011, p. 1. 
5. OECD, Regulatory Management Systems’ Indicators Survey in Government at a Glance, 2009, p. 99. 
Priority Action 1: Make the preparation of Regulation Impact Statements a mandatory 
legislative requirement for regulations. 
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Performance and accountability framework for regulators 
Disciplined regulation making must be matched by effective administration if the whole regulatory 
system is to work more efficiently. 
Australian Governments have given periodic attention to reforms aimed at strengthening the 
conduct and governance of regulators, particularly in the years following the Uhrig review and 
Banks Regulation Taskforce. However, this attention has never been sustained by ongoing reforms 
to strengthen the performance framework for regulators and place them on a path of continuous 
improvement. 
Poor performance by regulators can have a significant effect on business through creating 
regulatory uncertainty, causing unnecessary delay to critical business transactions and placing an 
excessive burden on business through overly aggressive enforcement practices. 
The recent growth of regulators 
At the same time that there has been limited attention on improving performance and accountability 
mechanisms, the resources and influence of regulators have grown considerably. 
While there is no consolidated information available on the resources of the hundreds of business 
regulators at the Commonwealth and state levels, BCA analysis of the resources of some major 
Commonwealth regulators reveals their considerable growth over the last decade.  
In some cases, regulators have grown at a rate in excess of Commonwealth expenditure and the 
economy more broadly, although there has been some moderation in growth in recent years.  
Some growth can be explained as the legitimate response to increased risks from events such as 
the global financial crisis as well as the considerable growth and innovation in financial and other 
markets. This obviously necessitates increased monitoring and surveillance to maintain orderly and 
well-functioning markets. There is also a need to ensure that the resources of regulators are 
targeted and prioritised in a manner that delivers effective and efficient oversight.  
In the case of the ACCC, it is important to note that it has taken on the newly established Australian 
Energy Regulator (AER) and other new regulatory responsibilities with the introduction of the 
Australian Consumer Law during this time.6 
Nonetheless, the BCA remains concerned that such significant increases in regulatory capacity 
over the past 10 years do not appear to have been accompanied by a strengthening of the 
performance and accountability framework. 
 
6. It has not been possible based on publicly available information to isolate the growth of the ACCC over this period, 
excluding the AER. However, calculating growth from a more consistent starting point when the AER was established in 
2005–06 still yields expenditure and employment growth rates of a significant magnitude. For example, expenditure 
grew at an average nominal rate of 11.2 per cent per annum between 2005–06 and 2012–13 and 9.4 per cent per 
annum between 2006–07 and 2012–13. 
Recommendation 1: The Commonwealth Government should publish a government risk 
policy that sets out clearly the criteria and approach it will take in determining if and how it will 
intervene to manage particular risks faced by the community.  
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Average annual expenditure growth 2003 to 2013 
(% nominal) 
 
Source: Regulator Annual Reports and Final Budget Outcome 2012–13. ACCC includes AER. 
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Recommendation 2: The Commonwealth Government should publish consolidated 
information on the resources of its regulators on an annual basis, including how they are 
funded. 
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Regulators vs economy: Employment Index 
(2002–03 = 100) 
 
Source: Regulator Annual reports and ABS cat. no. 6202.0. 
Note: ATO, ACCC and APRA data are total employees as at end of financial year, except APRA data for 2010–11, 
2011–12 and 2012–13 which exclude casual staff. ASIC staff numbers are full-time equivalent averages over the 
year. ACCC includes establishment of the AER in 2005–06. 
Assessing the current performance and accountability framework 
Given the important role that regulators play, the BCA’s Standards For Rule Making include 
eight standards to underpin the objective of regulation being administered by regulators in the most 
efficient manner possible to facilitate economic progress. These standards are: 
1. Regulators are subject to regular and meaningful performance assessment and reporting. 
2. The government’s expectations of a regulator are transparent, and are clearly within the scope of 
the regulator’s powers. 
3. Regulators follow a risk-based approach to enforcement and compliance activities. 
4. Regulatory decisions are timely. 
5. Regulators are continuously streamlining their processes. 
6. There is a clear separation of roles between policymakers and regulators. 
7. Regulators adopt a client-focused approach to regulated parties. 
8. Regulatory decisions are fair and contestable. 
The BCA has undertaken a desktop review of the performance and accountability framework as it 
relates to these standards for large economic regulators like the ATO, ACCC, APRA and ASIC. 
The performance and accountability framework for these regulators were chosen because they are 
among the largest and most high-profile business regulators in the country, with the most evolved 
governance frameworks of Australian regulators. To the extent that there are weaknesses in the 
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framework governing these regulators, then such weaknesses could be expected to be common 
across the board.  
Our review has revealed weaknesses in the current performance and accountability framework for 
regulators against the eight standards and found that there are some clear areas for improvement 
(see ‘Assessment of current performance and accountability framework’ below). 
The weaknesses outlined here are by no means the sole responsibility of the regulators. 
Policymakers and the community have a role in influencing and designing legislative and other 
parameters within which regulators operate and against which their effectiveness is judged. 
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Assessment of current performance and accountability framework 
Regulator standard Overall 
assessment 
Issues 
1. Regulators are 
subject to regular 
and meaningful 
performance 
assessment and 
reporting 
Needs 
improvement 
• Measurement is largely driven by variables such as enforcement actions 
and timely completion of highly transactional activities, without sufficient 
attention on the broader objective of efficiency and facilitating economic 
progress. 
• Regulators are not subject to regular scrutiny by an independent economic 
and regulatory expert like the Productivity Commission. 
2. The government’s 
expectations of a 
regulator are 
transparent, and are 
clearly within the 
scope of the 
regulator’s powers 
Best practice 
mechanisms 
not being 
applied 
• The last published statements of expectation from ministers are from 2007. 
• The lack of annual updates has come at a time when there have been 
significant events such as the global financial crisis and multiple changes of 
ministerial and senior personnel overseeing the regulators. 
• In New Zealand this process is legislated 
3. Regulators follow 
a risk-based 
approach to 
enforcement and 
compliance activities 
Needs 
improvement 
• It is difficult to confirm how some regulators (e.g. ACCC and ASIC) apply a 
risk-based approach to compliance and enforcement.  
• These regulators appear to have clearly articulated priorities, but the risk-
based process for arriving at these priorities and how enforcement and 
compliance processes are aligned to risk need to be more transparent. 
4. Regulatory 
decisions are timely 
Needs 
improvement 
 
 
• Timelines are rarely legislated, and even if they are considerable flexibility 
remains. 
• Limited interrogation of performance for important decisions for regulatory 
parties that fall beyond standard timeframes. 
• Limited incentives to resolve matters quickly once deadlines have been 
exceeded, such as deemed approval provisions. 
5. Regulators are 
continuously 
streamlining their 
processes 
Absence of 
supporting 
initiatives 
• Notable lack of formal commitments from regulators to streamline their 
processes to reduce the burden of regulation. 
• Previous stakeholder surveys appear to suggest that they are not feeling 
the effects of reduced red tape through streamlined processes on the 
ground and that reducing the cost of regulation is not a high priority for 
regulators. 
6. Clear separation 
of roles between 
policymakers and 
regulators 
Needs 
improvement 
• There is a tendency to delegate the detail of regulation making to 
regulators, but checks and balances do not appear to have been 
strengthened. 
• There is also evidence of some regulators seeking to drive the policy 
debate rather than accepting the law as they find it. 
7. Regulators adopt 
a client-focused 
approach to 
regulated parties 
Needs 
improvement 
• Despite a range of formal mechanisms supporting a client-focused 
approach, the flawed starting point for client service charters are 
transactional targets first rather than understanding the business and 
circumstances of regulated parties. 
• The regulated community remains reluctant to raise complaints about a 
regulator for fear of regulatory retribution. This situation has not changed in 
a decade (since the last government review). 
8. Regulatory 
decisions are fair and 
contestable 
Needs 
improvement 
• Increasing resort to appeals and judicial avenues driven in part by 
increasing complexity of legislation, due to not getting regulatory design 
right. 
• Regulators also need to live up to their ‘model litigant’ aspirations. 
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Strengthening the performance and accountability framework 
The BCA would like to see the performance and accountability framework for regulators 
fundamentally strengthened to more closely align with best practice.  
As the Banks taskforce suggested “... the actions and attitudes of regulators, like those of business, 
are shaped by the incentives they face as well as by the requirements placed on them.”7 Therefore, 
the best way to drive greater accountability is to have major regulators operating within a new 
legislative framework that provides incentives to balance rigorous enforcement with efficiency and 
facilitating economic progress while continually improving their processes. This requires: 
• A balanced performance framework that focuses not just on transactional enforcement and 
compliance activities by regulators, but also on the objective of facilitating economic progress, by 
balancing risk with the costs imposed.  
• Greater oversight of regulators so that regulators have appropriate independence from 
government, but are not above scrutiny or accountability to portfolio ministers and a dedicated 
independent body.  
• Regulators clearly documenting and consistently implementing a risk-based approach to 
enforcement and compliance activities.  
• Appropriate checks and balances on the regulation-making and policy powers of regulators to 
manage the risk that regulators, in effect, become policymakers and seek to bestow increased 
powers upon themselves.  
• A general requirement that regulators establish public targets on streamlining their processes and 
associated regulatory burden each year. This could be measured in terms of an annual reduction 
in average time spent by each regulated party on administrative compliance activities and 
administrative delays experienced. 
• A requirement that client service charters more strongly focus on the need for regulators to 
understand the business of regulated parties better and outline their standards and approach for 
most effectively engaging and interacting with regulated parties. 
Oversight of regulators under a new legislative framework 
Independent oversight will be critical in facilitating and measuring adherence to a new legislative 
performance and accountability framework for regulators. This role could be undertaken by an 
Inspector-General of Regulation.  
Clearly the creation of a new body to oversee regulators would need to avoid the pitfalls of 
duplication and the creation of another layer of bureaucracy that fails to deliver improvements to 
government regulation. Such a body would need to have a very clear and differentiated mandate 
from existing bodies. 
Its role would need to involve critically reviewing the performance of regulators, with the objective 
of driving better regulator performance and also driving streamlined regulation where poor regulator 
performance and unnecessary costs are the direct result of poorly designed regulation. 
This could have the useful benefit of more complete oversight of the entire regulatory system – with 
a body that has oversight of the regulatory system at the regulator interface where the practical 
impact of regulation begins to materialise. An independent and empowered body would have an 
incentive to drive change and suggest improvements in the design of regulations and practice of 
regulators based on practical and objective experience. 
  
 
7. Regulation Taskforce, Rethinking Regulation: Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, 
January 2006, p. 159. 
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The proposal to improve the performance and accountability of regulators in this way is not new. 
Almost a decade ago the Uhrig review recommended that the Commonwealth establish an 
Inspector-General of Regulation with a view to providing the community with a mechanism to 
ensure that regulators are being held accountable, and as a matter of good governance. 
Investing resources in such a body is justified on the basis of the considerable cost of poorly 
designed and administered regulation on the community. Eliminating just a fraction of this cost 
each year may derive a net benefit. In addition, active oversight may ultimately increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of regulatory bodies. 
• Various options and issues around the proposal for an Inspector-General of Regulation are 
canvassed in Part 2 of this paper. 
 
Undertake a number of procedural quick wins 
There are a number of opportunities for the government to extend current processes and 
procedures to ensure that regulators’ efforts are well targeted.  
Firstly, while there is little evidence of systemic failures in the separation of policymaking from 
regulators, there is room for more clearly defining the role of regulators in this area, particularly as 
technical regulation and guidance is increasingly issued by regulators. 
Secondly, there is a need to ensure that there are transparent and effective mechanisms for 
regulated parties, courts and regulators to identify and report areas of regulation that are complex 
and uncertain and that lead to expensive and potentially unnecessary resort to formal dispute 
mechanisms. These costs occur at the back-end of the regulatory process due to poor design at 
the front-end or regulation failing to keep pace with economic and technological developments. 
A number of procedural ‘quick wins’ are outlined below that should be pursued as a matter of 
priority and implemented within the next 12 months. 
Priority Action 2: Implement a new performance and accountability code for all major 
regulators in omnibus legislation. The code would be supported by provisions for: 
• The establishment of an Inspector-General of Regulation to provide additional oversight of 
regulators, including undertaking biennial performance audits of major regulators and 
responding to systemic issues identified by regulated parties. Such a body could be 
established within the Productivity Commission with a clear mandate to take active steps to 
improve regulator performance and recommend the streamlining of regulation where it is 
impeding the efficiency of regulators and placing unnecessary costs on regulated parties. 
• A balanced performance reporting framework that assesses not only enforcement and 
compliance activities but the extent to which these are undertaken efficiently. 
• Regulators to prepare annual ‘Statements of Accountability’ that outline the basis for 
measuring the success of the regulator in agreement with the portfolio minister and the 
Inspector-General of Regulation. 
• Regulators to establish public targets on streamlining their processes to reduce regulatory 
burden each year. 
• Regulators to document, regularly update and adhere to a risk-based approach to 
compliance and enforcement activities. 
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Reducing the stock of poor regulation 
As noted previously, regulators and the regulated community must also contend with a 
considerable stock of poorly designed and complex regulation. 
Poor regulatory process, layering new requirements upon existing regulation without asking 
fundamental questions first, and failing to regularly review and streamline the stock of regulation 
have left a considerable challenge for governments to unwind the red tape burden. 
As the Productivity Commission suggests, improving the efficiency, effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the regulatory stock requires continuous improvement through routine 
management and programmed reviews. It also requires prioritisation of individual areas of 
regulation where reform is likely to have high payoffs. 
Proper management of the stock of regulation is absolutely critical for Australia’s regulatory system 
to take the next step towards what the OECD refers to as “an embedded program of continuous 
improvement in regulation”.8 
On this basis, the BCA considers that there are two key fronts upon which efforts to streamline the 
existing stock of regulation should proceed: 
• Embedding systematic processes to address the stock of regulation. 
• Streamlining critical areas of regulatory burden. 
  
 
8. OECD, Australia: Towards a Seamless National Economy, OECD, 2010, p. 118. 
Recommendation 5: The Commonwealth Government should extend the Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel’s ‘Complexity Flag System’ to cover existing legislation in addition to 
new legislation being drafted. This would allow regulated parties, courts and regulators to 
identify and report existing areas of legislation that are complex and uncertain and that are 
driving unnecessary resort to courts and formal mechanisms. Interim and longer-term actions 
to resolve these complexities could then be devised. 
Recommendation 4: The Office of Parliamentary Counsel, in collaboration with the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, should issue guidance to policymakers and 
legislative drafters. This guidance should have regard to appropriate constraints that should 
be placed on the regulation-making role of regulators when drafting such roles into 
legislation. 
Recommendation 3: The Auditor-General, in updating the Australian National Audit Office’s 
Guide to Administering Regulation, should include guidance on the appropriate role of 
regulators in relation to policymaking. It should also outline how regulations, procedures and 
guidance should be developed and monitored to ensure that it does not encroach on 
policymaking that is rightfully the role of the executive arm of government. 
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Systematic processes to address the stock of regulation 
Systematic processes and mechanisms to deal with the stock of regulation should complement 
better regulation-making processes and act as an additional stop-gap in the regulatory system. 
Over time, these processes, if successful, should also reduce the need for costly wholesale 
stocktakes of regulation and large-scale regulatory reform processes.  
Evening out the current bias towards new regulation 
Currently, incentives in the regulatory system are largely in favour of introducing new regulation, 
rather than removing ineffective or overly burdensome regulation. In order to provide an incentive 
and regularly prompt government to reassess ineffective or overly burdensome regulation, 
agencies and ministers should be required to make every attempt to identify an offsetting reduction 
in existing red tape each time new regulation is introduced.  
These sorts of mechanisms have been assessed by some regulatory experts as being a relatively 
crude mechanism for managing the regulatory stock. Notwithstanding these assessments, we 
believe that such a mechanism needs to be implemented as a stop-gap measure, with the case for 
its ongoing use re-evaluated after five years. It may take some time for governments to establish 
both a meaningful and workable offsetting regime. Therefore, less sophisticated interim measures 
such as ‘one in, one out’ within the same portfolio may have to be employed to even out the bias 
towards increasing the stock of regulation. 
 
Implement existing findings on the stock of regulation 
Given the strong body of existing work from the Productivity Commission that has reviewed key 
areas of the regulatory stock, every effort should be made to utilise these reports. While in many 
cases the government has published responses to these reviews, in most cases such responses 
lack implementation plans and it would appear that many recommendations have not been 
implemented. The BCA would like to see these reviews taken seriously and their recommendations 
implemented thoroughly with reform progress monitored, unless there are particularly strong public 
interest grounds for not implementing a recommendation. 
 
Assess and address cumulative regulatory burdens 
Many agencies introduce regulation without a complete understanding of the cumulative burden of 
regulation on the sector or part of the economy that they are regulating. As a result, there is often a 
narrow focus on the marginal effect of new rules without proper appreciation of duplication, overlap 
and the full costs of regulation that are being imposed on a sector. 
In future, the Productivity Commission’s annual benchmarking and regulatory burden review 
programs could be consolidated and structured to provide rolling audits of the cumulative 
regulatory burden in each industry sector at least every five years. 
 
Recommendation 6: Australian Governments should seek to implement all of the 155 
recommendations from the Productivity Commission’s annual reviews of regulatory burden 
that were undertaken from 2007 to 2011. 
Priority Action 3: Require all new regulations that will result in a significant increase in 
regulatory burden to have an equivalent offsetting red tape reduction within the same 
portfolio.  
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Sunsetting and statutory reviews 
The Legislative Instruments Act currently provides for the automatic sunsetting of a range of 
delegated legislative instruments every 10 years. Analysis conducted by the Office of Best Practice 
Regulation has also identified that legislation and regulation introduced since 2007 has generally 
been subject to statutory review provisions.9 
These sorts of review mechanisms not only provide a prompt for regular refreshing of the 
regulatory stock but also a strong incentive to get regulatory design right in the first instance. They 
also put in place arrangements for monitoring the effectiveness of the regulation to justify its future 
reinstatement or continuation. 
The BCA acknowledges that it is problematic to extend automatic sunset provisions to apply to all 
primary legislation due to uncertainty and because of the considerable parliamentary and 
legislative drafting workload that would be involved. However, this has not stopped jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom in implementing robust and well-targeted sunsetting mechanisms for 
primary legislation. For this reason, we believe that sunsetting arrangements should be extended to 
primary legislation that has a significant impact where it is practicable to do so. Part 3 of this paper 
highlights in further detail how this might be sensibly done. 
Similarly, requiring statutory reviews would serve to reinforce and institutionalise current practice 
rather than creating additional burdens. 
 
Streamlining critical areas of regulatory burden 
In identifying areas of priority for regulatory reform, the BCA does not consider that providing a long 
list of detailed regulatory irritants is the most constructive approach to progressing meaningful 
reform.  
An efficient regulatory system focused on continual improvement and frequent dialogue with 
regulated parties should address these issues as a matter of course. Nonetheless, for illustrative 
purposes this paper does identify various examples of cumbersome regulatory provisions. 
  
 
9. Commonwealth Government, Preliminary Government Response to the Independent Review of the Australian 
Government’s Regulatory Impact Analysis Process, 11 October 2012, p. 10. 
Recommendation 8: Regularly refresh and streamline the regulatory stock by better 
targeting existing review and sunsetting requirements: 
• Extend sunsetting requirements to primary legislation where it has a significant impact and 
it is practicable to subject it to a full remaking every 10 years. 
• All primary legislation and legislative instruments that have highly significant or uncertain 
impacts on business and the community should be subject to statutory review every five 
years.  
Recommendation 7: Reinvigorate the Productivity Commission’s annual benchmarking and 
regulatory burden review programs by establishing rolling audits of the cumulative regulatory 
burden in each industry sector at least every five years.  
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In doing so, the BCA has placed greater focus on identifying broad areas of regulation often 
spanning multiple regulatory instruments and jurisdictions that are systemically inefficient. We have 
also identified areas of regulation that are strategically important – that is, areas of regulation 
critical to future economic growth and meeting looming challenges. 
On this basis, the paper identifies five areas of inefficient regulation that are in urgent need of 
reform. A number of recommended actions are also detailed. 
Planning and zoning regulation 
Taking full advantage of the substantial potential of our cities as they grow involves managing 
growth and mitigating the impacts of congestion. Our major cities support 80 per cent of GDP and 
they are key drivers of productivity.10 This means that our planning and zoning regulation will need 
to become considerably more agile to promote both economic growth and liveability. 
Despite the Productivity Commission finding that planning and zoning represents “one of the most 
complex regulatory regimes operating in Australia”, COAG progress on this matter has been slow 
and state reform plans have been relatively unambitious with the possible exception of New South 
Wales.  
The BCA has previously made a number of recommendations in this regard. These include the 
adoption of risk-based regulation by all jurisdictions, streamlining of environmental approvals by the 
states, improved best practice arrangements for assessment of major project approvals, and 
removing concurrent powers of other state government agencies. In addition, the BCA has 
recommended regional planning to identify major land use and associated infrastructure 
requirements, and the reservation of areas for designated activity as part of strategic planning. 
Retail sector regulation  
The retail sector is one of Australia’s largest employers, accounting for over 11 per cent of 
Australia’s workforce.11 
It is confronting an increasingly challenging environment, including the recent strength of the 
Australian dollar, online competition and the newly cautious consumer. Given the considerable 
structural challenges before the retail sector, it is critical that there are not undue regulatory 
impediments to the sector responding and adapting flexibly to these challenges. 
The retail sector operates across a range of burdensome and complex regulatory regimes including 
planning and zoning, retail tenancy regulation, transport restrictions, retail trading hours, workplace 
relations and a range of inconsistent state-based regulation. The Commonwealth Government’s 
response to a comprehensive inquiry into the sector by the Productivity Commission noted or 
agreed in principle to many of the inquiry’s recommendations without mapping out an 
implementation plan or seeking the explicit cooperation of the states to progress reform. 
Environmental assessment and approvals 
While resources investment is showing clear signs of easing, it is still expected to remain a critical 
part of our economy in the period ahead, representing 6 per cent of GDP in 2013–14.12 This only 
serves to reinforce the importance of ensuring that any unnecessary or overly burdensome 
regulatory requirements on investment are addressed. 
Regulatory impediments put at risk the cost-effectiveness and competitiveness of Australia’s 
investment pipeline; there are almost $900 billion of committed and prospective investment 
opportunities in large-scale projects, mostly in resources and economic infrastructure.13 
  
 
10. Australian Government, Our Cities – Building a Productive, Sustainable and Liveable Future, 2010, p. 18. 
11. ABS, Labour Force, Australia, Detailed, Quarterly, cat. no. 6291.0.55.003, May 2013. 
12. ABS, Private New Capital Expenditure and Expected Expenditure, Australia, cat. no. 5625.0, March 2013. 
13. Deloitte Access Economics, Investment Monitor, September 2013. 
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The costs and delays associated with environmental impact assessment and approval are 
significant. An Australian National University study estimated direct costs to all industries of up to 
$820 million over the life of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) 
Act.14 Further, the referrals process under the EPBC Act is resource and cost-intensive, with 
referrals ranging from $30,000 to $100,000.15 
The BCA has previously cited the example of one BCA member company which completed an 
environmental assessment process that took more than two years, involved more than 4,000 
meetings, briefings and presentations across interest groups, and resulted in a 12,000-page report. 
When approved, more than 1,500 conditions – 1,200 from the state and 300 from the 
Commonwealth – were imposed. These conditions have a further 8,000 sub-conditions attached to 
them. In total, the company invested more than $25 million in the environmental impact 
assessment. 
Given the experience of the operators and of government departments in respectively conducting 
and assessing these kinds of activities, there is scope for removing the current double handing 
within and between governments, without compromising environmental objectives. One way of 
achieving this would be for the Commonwealth to negotiate bilateral agreements under the EPBC 
Act to accredit state government environmental approvals.  
Workplace relations regulation 
Improvements in productivity and competitiveness are likely to flow from working smarter, not 
harder, by being innovative in product and service design by adopting new technologies, work 
processes and supply chains – changing what businesses do and how they do it. 
Industrial relations regulations have a rightful role to play in addressing legitimate community 
concerns about workers’ basic rights. But equally they have to preserve the ability of businesses to 
engage effectively with their employees to change work arrangements in response to commercial 
imperatives and achieve improvements in competitiveness that are critical to the sustainability of 
companies and their workforces. 
The Productivity Commission has outlined how flexible workplace arrangements enable firms to 
adapt more readily to changing circumstances, for example to meet changes in demand by: 
• Adjusting the workforce size either through engaging or dismissing employees, the short-term 
use of casuals or contracting out of functions traditionally performed in-house. 
• Varying the scheduling and intensity of use of the existing workforce – strategies include flexible 
rostering for overtime and shift work and scheduling rostered-days-off and annual leave to 
coincide with low demand. 
• Moving labour between functional areas – this strategy requires that workers have both the skills 
and willingness to move between tasks and requires the removal or reduction of any barriers that 
may exist. 
• Linking remuneration and therefore unit labour costs to product demand and output rather than 
hours worked – approaches include sales commissions or incentives and bonus or profit sharing 
schemes. 
One way to enable firms to adapt in this way is to create the institutional, policy and regulatory 
environment in which businesses can respond effectively to competitive pressures. This should 
involve regulation that supports direct engagement between employers and employees at the 
enterprise level, reduces unnecessary uncertainty and risk, removes barriers to job creation, 
 
14. A. Macintosh, ‘The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth): An Evaluation of 
Its Cost-Effectiveness’, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 26, 2009, p. 337; and A. Macintosh, 
The EPBC Act Survey Project: Preliminary Data Report, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, 
Australian National University, 2009. 
15. Productivity Commission, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation: Planning, Zoning 
and Development Assessments, 2011. 
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creates incentives for collaboration and minimises industrial conflict, and delivers fair remuneration 
outcomes that reward effort. 
Companies have identified provisions in the current legislative framework which are being used, 
frequently in combination, to undermine competitiveness, impede productivity and job creation, and 
add unnecessary delays and costs to doing business. 
Corporate governance regulation 
Corporate governance is a critical driver of company performance through its effects on 
entrepreneurialism, innovation, accountability and risk management. The level of corporate 
governance red tape has increased significantly in recent years as the regulatory framework has 
shifted from a performance to a conformance-based approach evident in approaches to executive 
remuneration and gender equity reporting.  
For example, in the Australian Institute of Company Directors’ most recent survey, company 
directors estimated red-tape compliance consumes an average of 26 per cent of their total board 
commitment, with more than half believing that this level of commitment has increased in the last 
12 months.16  
This rise in compliance burden comes despite Australia placing in the top 10 countries 
internationally for the efficacy of our corporate boards.17 
How to streamline regulatory burden in these areas 
Planning and zoning, retail sector and environmental regulation 
Planning and zoning, retail sector regulation and environmental assessment and approvals are all 
areas that have previously been taken up on COAG’s agenda for reform. 
At a time when some are questioning the strength of Australia’s federation, implementing ambitious 
reforms in these areas through a degree of collaboration and healthy regulatory competition 
requires a circuit-breaker that moves beyond the traditional models of COAG regulatory reform. 
Productivity payments could encourage more timely and expansive regulatory reform in areas of 
significance to the national economy like planning, retail sector regulation and environmental 
approvals.  
It would be a ‘bottom-up’ reform process with states submitting their best proposals for deregulating 
and lifting productivity in these areas and others through a competitive bid process. The possible 
benefits of reform proposals would be assessed by the Productivity Commission to inform choices 
around bid funding. The Productivity Commission could also assess state eligibility for payments, 
should the reforms meet their objectives. 
The experience of National Competition Policy demonstrated that reward payments work in driving 
major microeconomic reform by the states and territories.  
With the Commonwealth continuing to collect over 80 per cent of taxes in the federation,18 it stands 
to gain greater fiscal benefits from the economic gains of state reform and it is therefore 
appropriate that some of these gains are distributed to the states for their efforts through the 
productivity payments. 
 
16. Ipsos–Australian Institute of Company Directors, Director Sentiment Index: Research Findings, April 2013, p. 17. 
17. World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–14, 2013. 
18. ABS, Taxation Revenue in Australia 2011–12, cat. no. 5506.0, April 2013. 
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Corporate governance regulation 
While the government should consider reform of the corporate governance regulatory environment 
with a view to streamlining requirements, there is also a case for hastening slowly so as not to 
increase uncertainty for firms.  
A useful first step would be for the government to commission a study to quantify the cumulative 
compliance burden of corporate governance regulation in Australia. This would provide 
policymakers with a better understanding of the existing regulatory burden from corporate 
governance regulation before introducing new requirements. It would also provide a strong basis 
for targeting areas of regulation for streamlining. 
 
Workplace relations 
It is inevitable that the workplace regulatory framework will need to change substantially to cope 
with an increasingly competitive global landscape, rapid technological developments, changing 
consumer demand and an ageing workforce. In the longer term this requires a fundamental rethink 
of the regulatory framework that will be most conducive to productive workplaces, in light of these 
trends. 
In the shorter term, the government should pursue a number of immediate changes to the 
Fair Work Act that aim to foster greater flexibility and innovation and constrain business costs.  
Recommendation 10: The government should commission a study to quantify the 
cumulative compliance burden of corporate governance regulation in Australia. 
Recommendation 9: In introducing productivity payments to the states in order to encourage 
regulatory improvement and efficiency in areas of significance to the national economy, the 
Commonwealth Government should target the first round of competitive funding bids on state 
reforms to planning and zoning, environmental assessment and approval and retail sector 
regulation. 
Priority Action 4: Introduce productivity payments from the Commonwealth to the states in 
order to encourage regulatory improvement and efficiency. Payments should target state-led 
regulatory reform in areas of significance to the national economy and involving multiple 
levels of government regulators. 
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Recommendation 11: The government should make immediate changes to the Fair Work 
Act to foster greater flexibility and innovation and constrain business costs. Amendments 
should include: 
• reducing the range of matters that can be bargained over 
• providing access to employer-only greenfield agreements 
• enhancing the capacity to agree flexibility arrangements with employees including through 
individual flexibility arrangements 
• reducing the scope of the adverse actions provisions 
• limiting access to protected industrial action where there has been unreasonable or 
capricious use of such action 
• limiting union entry rights to employer premises 
• making unlawful clauses which exclude the engagement of contractors or labour hire 
companies 
• modifying the “better off overall test” to provide for a broadening of matters that may be 
taken into account in the application of the test 
• modifying provisions relating to majority support determinations 
• amending the transfer of business arrangements to include a sunset clause after 
12 months. 
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Progressing the regulatory reform agenda 
The actions outlined in this paper are intended to address gaps in the regulation-making process; 
place greater checks and balances on our regulators; and streamline critical areas of existing 
regulation. If implemented, they should help set Australia on a course that sets the regulatory 
balance right and in doing so improve our competitiveness. 
Like the substantial body of regulatory reviews and reform proposals that have come before them, 
these actions will ultimately be ineffective and quickly forgotten if ministers and public servants are 
not genuinely committed to them. A ‘hearts and minds’ commitment is needed. 
Dedicated adherence to good process, rigorous policymaking practices and continuous 
improvement must become ‘business as usual’ for Australia’s regulatory system. Reform alone 
cannot achieve this; there must be a major cultural shift towards using regulation and its institutions 
in a more disciplined and discerning manner. This will increase its effectiveness and at the same 
time lower the unnecessary burden that poorly targeted regulation places on our competitiveness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The importance of efficient regulation 
Well-designed regulation can help to clarify the rules of the game, which increases certainty and 
reduces barriers to investment and expansion for business.  
However, poorly designed and administered regulation imposes significant costs on the community 
in terms of less consumer choice, higher prices, lower wages and reduced job creation. 
Commentary on the impact of regulation often focuses solely on the direct effects of regulation, 
which are easier to quantify – for example the direct costs to business of complying with a 
regulation and the financial cost to government of administering the regulation.  
While these costs are important, regulatory proposals often neglect to take into account the indirect 
effects of regulation. These are far more difficult to measure, but nevertheless have a significant 
effect on the long-term productivity and competitiveness of business, as evident from the example 
in Exhibit 1. 
These indirect effects can stifle the incentives of firms to innovate, invest and employ new workers. 
They also limit the flexibility of businesses to quickly adapt to changing circumstances and 
structural pressures. 
Where this occurs, regulation ultimately impedes productivity at a time when Australia can least 
afford it: multifactor productivity growth has been negative in seven of the last 10 years 
(see Figure 1). While there are a range of structural explanations for Australia’s recent performance 
in this regard, it remains the case that excessive and poorly designed regulation will only further 
impede productivity growth prospects. 
Figure 1: Australia’s recent multifactor productivity performance 
(annual % growth) 
 
Source: ABS, Australian System of National Accounts, cat. no. 5204.0, 2012–13. Note: Multifactor productivity is 
measured on a quality-adjusted hours-worked basis. 
We must undertake a critical analysis of the indirect effects on productivity of each piece of new 
and existing regulation, as well as the performance of the bodies responsible for enforcing them. 
This is particularly critical at a time when long-term multifactor productivity growth is largely 
stagnant, and when commodity prices are no longer trending upwards to keep incomes growing. 
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Current state of regulation in Australia 
The BCA acknowledges that there has been progress in regulatory reform in recent years in 
Australia – most notably the progression of some of the Seamless National Economy reforms. 
However, these efforts have been overshadowed by the substantial stock of existing regulation 
that remains to be tackled, as well as the ever-increasing burden of new regulation. 
In this context, the BCA considers that there are five key issues that governments must take into 
account when approaching regulatory reform: 
 Australia has a substantial stock of existing regulation, a significant proportion of which is likely 
to be unnecessary, excessive or poorly designed. 
− At last count, Australia had well over half a million pages of regulation and 24,000 different 
licences across the country for a range of activities.19 
 The stock of regulation in Australia is growing at a rapid rate. 
− The Commonwealth Parliament has on average introduced 6,000 pages of new legislation 
each year over the last decade.20 
 This regulatory burden is increasing the pressure on Australia’s competitiveness, at a time when 
the economy is experiencing significant structural changes. This will result in substantial costs if 
scarce resources are unnecessarily tied up in responding to over-regulation. 
− Australia currently ranks 128th out of 148 nations on the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Index for regulatory burden, down another 32 places from 2012.21 
 Over the past decade there have been numerous detailed analyses of regulatory systems in 
Australia, together with recommendations on what needs to be done to make them more 
effective and efficient, thereby reducing the burden on business. 
− Since 2007 the Productivity Commission’s annual programs of benchmarking and reviewing 
regulation alone have produced over 4,500 pages of analysis and 155 recommendations, 
while attracting 600 submissions from the community.22 
 
19. Productivity Commission, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation: Quantity and Quality and Cost 
of Business Registration, December 2008 and Regulation Taskforce, Rethinking Regulation: Report of the Taskforce on 
Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, January 2006. Note that the number of pages of regulation does not include 
local government. 
20. Deloitte Access Economics, ‘Reforming Australia’s Regulatory Culture’ (Unpublished), 2011. 
21. World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012–13, 2012. 
Exhibit 1: Regulation and innovation in practice 
Cochlear is an Australian-based exporter of medical devices.  A key regulatory issue it faces 
is that a number of countries require a device to be approved in its country of origin before it 
can be approved for use in the export destination country. 
In one recent case, approval for an important product innovation took 14 months longer in 
Australia than in Europe. That is, after obtaining regulatory approval in Europe, it took an 
additional 14 months before Cochlear could even start to apply for product registrations in 
other key markets such as India. As a result, Cochlear was several years behind its 
European competitor in getting its product into a number of key markets. 
This delay is a reflection of the legislative framework under which the relevant regulator 
(the Therapeutic Goods Administration) operates and the allocation of resources.  
Dr C. Roberts (CEO of Cochlear Limited), 2012 JJC Bradfield Institute Lecture, Sydney, 
23 October 2012. 
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 Yet, the challenge remains in putting good principles and processes into practice and 
successfully implementing sensible reforms to existing regulation. 
− The Productivity Commission recently concluded that a “degree of cynicism is pervading the 
regulatory landscape in response to the perceived lack of integrity in regulation making.” 23 
This paper should be considered as the latest in a series of contributions to the public policy debate 
on how to restore the integrity of our regulatory system and work towards more efficient regulation. 
Purpose and structure of the paper 
Last year the BCA released its Standards for Rule Making, outlining the BCA’s expectations of a 
high-performing regulatory system capable of delivering regulatory outcomes in the public interest.  
The objective of the standards is to improve the accountability of governments and regulators for 
achieving these outcomes, by measuring their performance against the standards. 
This paper represents the first step in this process. In it, we undertake a high-level assessment of 
key aspects of the regulatory system, with a focus on the performance and accountability 
frameworks that govern Commonwealth regulators. In doing this we have focused on four key 
Commonwealth agencies responsible for economic regulation: the ATO, ASIC, the ACCC and 
APRA.  
The paper also provides a number of recommendations on the specific steps that governments can 
take to ensure that regulation is better targeted, regulators are held more accountable and 
governments begin to tackle areas of the existing stock of regulation that are most important to 
future economic growth. 
The paper is structured in the following parts: 
• Part 1: Stopping the flow of poor regulation 
This part reiterates the BCA’s expectations of a good regulatory system, and outlines how 
regulatory gatekeeping could be improved to stop poor-quality regulation being made in the first 
place. 
• Part 2: Performance and accountability framework for regulators 
The first section of Part 2 describes recent trends in the growth of regulators and the implications of 
this for our regulatory system. It then examines how the performance and accountability framework 
for major Commonwealth Government regulators aligns with best practice.  
• Part 3: Reducing the stock of poor regulation 
This part outlines actions to reduce the current stock of poor regulation by identifying ongoing stock 
management mechanisms and priority areas of overly burdensome regulation that are in need of 
reform, along with actions to address these areas.  
 
22. BCA calculations based on information obtained from the Productivity Commission website. This excludes one-off 
inquiries. 
23. Productivity Commission, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Benchmarking, August 2012, p. 281. 
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PART 1: STOPPING THE FLOW OF POOR REGULATION 
A good regulatory system will respond to emerging risks in a rational, predictable, efficient and 
effective manner. It will allocate the risks to those in society who are best able to manage them. 
The BCA has developed the Standards for Rule Making to make clear how a regulatory system 
must operate to produce outcomes in the public interest. 
In a good regulatory system, regulations will be enforced in a way that assures the community 
that their objectives are being achieved in the most efficient and low-cost manner. 
We believe that, by their very nature, the standards should have bipartisan support. 
The standards apply to the entire regulatory system, from the initial identification of a problem or 
risk that may need a regulatory response, to determining the responsibility and accountability of 
regulators, and through to the review and ultimate repeal of regulations. 
There are 30 standards that are organised around five central principles, which are based on 
commonsense propositions. 
The BCA recognises that some of these principles are not new, and a number already feature in 
governments’ guidance materials for regulation making. Yet, performance against them often falls 
short and sooner or later these shortcomings manifest themselves in poor regulation, with a 
permanent cost to the economy. 
The principles of a high-performing regulatory system 
1. The problem to be solved is well understood 
Before government seeks to regulate, it must understand the problem or policy priority in depth 
and test the case for regulation, along with the risks and consequences of not regulating a 
particular activity. 
2. New regulation is subject to cost–benefit analysis 
The costs of new regulation are thoroughly assessed and tested through a cost–benefit analysis, 
including an explicit understanding of the costs to both business and the wider community. 
3. Regulation achieves its objectives at least cost 
Regulation is carefully targeted to achieve its stated objectives and minimise the cost impacts on 
the community including business. 
4. Regulators perform efficiently 
Regulation is administered in the most efficient manner possible to facilitate economic progress. 
5. Regulation is constantly reviewed 
Existing regulations are continuously reviewed from first principles through new regulatory impact 
assessments, with regulations amended or removed if it cannot be established that they are 
appropriately targeted to an ongoing risk or problem. 
The following exhibit summarises the 30 standards.  
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Exhibit 2: BCA Standards for Rule Making 
1. Principle 1 
 Before government seeks to regulate, it must understand the problem or policy priority in 
depth and test the case for regulation, along with the risks and consequences of not 
regulating a particular activity. 
Standards 
1.1 Government conducts an early up-front risk assessment. 
1.2 Government has clear objectives for considering regulation. 
1.3 All options that are proportionate to the problem at hand are considered, including 
non-regulatory options. 
1.4 Preliminary analysis and the need for regulation is tested with stakeholders. 
2. Principle 2 
 The costs of new regulation are thoroughly assessed and tested with the community 
through cost–benefit analysis, which includes an explicit understanding of the costs to the 
community including business. 
Standards 
2.1 Cost–benefit analysis that includes a detailed understanding of the costs to 
business is the centrepiece of regulatory impact assessment processes. 
2.2 The depth of assessment is proportionate to the impact of the proposed regulation. 
2.3 The benefits of any new regulation are demonstrably assessed to outweigh the 
costs. 
2.4 Impact assessments ensure that proposed regulation does not unnecessarily 
restrict competition. 
2.5 Government and business regulatory treatment is neutral (where applicable). 
2.6 Regulatory impact assessments go hand-in-hand with policy development. 
2.7 Regulatory impact assessments are subject to independent oversight. 
2.8 Regulatory impact assessments are mandatory for significant regulations, 
with exceptions confined to very limited circumstances. 
2.9 Regulatory impact assessments are subject to adequate public consultation. 
2.10 Impact assessments have an eye to implementation. 
3. Principle 3 
 Regulation is carefully targeted to achieve its stated objectives and minimise the cost 
impacts on the community including business. 
Standards 
3.1 Regulation is generally drafted to be outcome-focused rather than prescriptively 
defining the inputs to regulatory compliance. 
3.2 Regulation is drafted in plain language and actually reflects the policy intent. 
3.3 Before drafting new regulation, governments test whether existing regulations or 
other Australian governments already address the same or related problem. 
3.4 Regulatory powers are designed to be proportionate to the problem being 
managed. 
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Substantive work has recently been completed on regulatory gate-keeping processes including the 
Borthwick–Milliner review of the RIA process, the Productivity Commission’s benchmarking of RIA 
processes, and the BCA’s Standards for Rule Making. 
We believe that the reform proposals to be implemented are the right ones, but will ultimately 
require a major cultural change in the way in which ministers and agencies commit to and engage 
with the process of regulatory scrutiny.  
In order to facilitate a major cultural change in regulatory design, there is a need to lift compliance 
with Regulation Impact Statements and also to prevent poorly conceived proposals entering the 
regulatory system in the first place by applying a risk-based approach to regulation.  
Lifting compliance with Regulation Impact Statements 
As the OECD has long suggested, the application of regulatory impact analysis can fluctuate with 
political commitment and pose serious problems for the quality of regulation.24 This is particularly 
the case where the requirement to undertake regulatory impact analysis is only an administrative 
requirement. 
 
24. OECD, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Best Practice in OECD Countries, 1997, p. 19. 
4. Principle 4 
 Regulation is administered by regulators in the most efficient manner possible to facilitate 
economic progress. 
Standards 
4.1 Clear separation of roles between policymakers and regulators. 
4.2 Regulators are subject to regular and meaningful performance assessment and 
reporting. 
4.3 The government’s expectations of a regulator are transparent and are clearly within 
the scope of the regulator’s powers. 
4.4 Regulators adopt a client-focused approach to regulated parties. 
4.5 Regulators follow a risk-based approach to enforcement and compliance activities. 
4.6 Regulatory decisions are timely. 
4.7 Regulatory decisions are fair and contestable. 
4.8 Regulators are continuously streamlining their processes. 
5. Principle 5 
 Existing regulation is constantly reviewed from first principles through new regulatory 
impact assessments, with regulations amended or removed if it cannot be established that 
they are appropriately targeted to an ongoing risk or problem. 
Standards 
5.1 Previous estimates of costs and benefits are tested against actual experience 
shortly after regulation is introduced. 
5.2 The ongoing relevance and effectiveness of regulation is regularly tested. 
5.3 Regulators collect data that makes it easier to evaluate the performance of 
regulation over time. 
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Since 2008–09 there have been 135 instances of either non-compliance or exemption in the 
Regulation Impact Statement process, with over 70 per cent of these representing cases of non-
compliance.25 
The Borthwick–Milliner review considered the case for giving greater legal status to the 
requirement to undertake a regulatory impact analysis. It was of the view that mandating the RIA in 
this way was not the preferred approach and should be considered as a last resort if the current 
arrangements cannot be made to work more effectively and consistently. It rightly observed that 
designing legislation for this purpose would require careful attention to ensure that it was not too 
general thereby providing too much leeway for agencies, or on the other hand not so specific that it 
constrains agencies too much. 
While the BCA acknowledges the challenges in legislating requirements for regulatory impact 
analysis to be undertaken, it is worth noting the strong case in favour of legislating for significant 
regulations to be subject to this analysis as a matter of course. The case would appear far stronger 
than many other areas that are being regulated and it appears that it would likely pass a cost–
benefit test and stand up to the scrutiny of regulatory impact analysis. For example: 
• It is likely to provide a net benefit. Various studies undertaken in this area demonstrate that the 
regulatory impact analysis process delivers net benefits. A recent study undertaken in Victoria 
showed that for every dollar invested in these processes, there was a return of $28 to $56 in 
avoided regulatory costs to the community.26 
• There are already examples of such legislation operating effectively in Australia. 
Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and the ACT all require subordinate legislation to be 
subjected to a Regulation Impact Statement. 
• There is an increasing trend for legislating RIAs in OECD countries. Between 1998 and 
2008, the number of OECD countries formally requiring RIAs by law almost tripled, from 10 to 29 
countries.27 
Improving the culture of compliance with regulatory impact analysis requirements needs a step 
change at the Commonwealth level through a commitment that will endure changes of government 
and changes at the senior levels of the public service.  
We therefore recommend that the government institute a legislative mandate for Regulation Impact 
Statements to be undertaken with only limited exceptions. The requirement should apply to any 
regulation with a significant impact, with the exception of regulation to address a genuine 
emergency situation, critical national security issue or urgent community safety issue, which cannot 
be addressed in the absence of immediate regulation.  
When combined with the new two-step Regulation Impact Statement process that is designed to 
embed regulatory analysis earlier in the policy process, this legislative requirement should facilitate 
early, consistent, rigorous and consultative regulatory analysis. 
 
 
25. OBPR, Australian Government Regulation Impact Statement Status by Agency 2012–13, p. 1. 
26. S. Abusah & C. Pingiaro, Cost-effectiveness of Regulatory Impact Assessment in Victoria – Staff Working Paper, 2011, 
p. 1. 
27. OECD, Regulatory Management Systems’ Indicators Survey in Government at a Glance, 2009, p. 99. 
Priority Action 1: Make the preparation of Regulation Impact Statements a mandatory 
legislative requirement for significant regulations. 
Business Council of Australia  32 
A risk-based approach to regulation 
We believe that the Standards for Rule Making effectively encapsulate a risk-based approach to 
regulation, with the identification, measurement and efficient management of risk in a proportionate 
manner as a key focus from the beginning to the end of the regulatory cycle.  
There is significant work to be done within government to develop a coherent risk policy, together 
with the necessary tools for decision-makers and regulators to implement an effective risk-based 
approach to policy. 
Risk-based regulation can only work if the community is prepared to accept some level of risk. As a 
first step, this requires the central government to develop a risk policy. 
This policy should include the notion of: 
• Acceptable risk: what risk can the community live with, are all risks equal, do perceptions of risk 
matter? 
• Risk allocation: who should bear a risk, who is best placed to reduce risk and what are the costs 
of reducing risk? 
Such a policy has the potential “... not only to reduce dramatically the burdens of regulation on 
society but also to reinforce national qualities of self-reliance, resilience and a spirit of adventure.”28 
This policy should broadly define the level of risk that is acceptable to the community. It should also 
set out how acceptable risks are allocated among stakeholders and where regulation is appropriate 
in managing risks. 
The purpose of such a risk policy is to firmly anchor the community’s expectations of what can and 
cannot be achieved by the regulatory system. Regulatory options should then be informed by this 
risk policy, Regulation Impact Statements should quantify and evaluate the impact of an 
intervention designed to reduce risks, and regulators should use this risk policy to prioritise their 
work and to allocate resources. 
 
 
28. UK Better Regulation Commission, Risk, Responsibility and Regulation – Whose Risk Is It Anyway?, October 2006, 
p. 5. 
Recommendation 1: The Commonwealth Government should publish a government risk 
policy that sets out clearly the criteria and approach that it will take in determining if and how 
it will intervene to manage particular risks faced by the community. 
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PART 2: PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR 
REGULATORS 
Having effective performance and accountability mechanisms for regulators is critically important to 
the proper functioning of regulatory systems. Regulators operating effectively and efficiently serve 
to ensure that confidence in public administration and governance is maintained and enhanced. 
Consequently, how a regulator performs its role is as important as the regulation itself. As the IMF 
recently stated, “... essential elements of good supervision need to be given as much attention as 
the regulatory reforms that are being contemplated.”29 
In spite of this, recent efforts at regulatory reform have had limited focus on the profound impact 
that regulators have on the efficient operation of our regulatory system. 
Part 2 seeks to address this by outlining: 
• the impacts of inefficient practices by regulators 
• the recent growth in the resources of the Commonwealth Government’s regulatory bodies 
• how the performance and accountability frameworks governing major regulators compare 
with best practice. 
The desktop review undertaken on the performance and accountability frameworks of regulators 
focuses on those regulators which are likely to have a significant impact on business transactions 
in the economy and which, because of their size and profile, might be expected to be subject to 
relatively better corporate governance and other controls. These regulators are the ATO, ASIC, 
ACCC and APRA. 
The impact of inefficient regulators 
The cost of less-than-optimal regulator performance manifests itself in a number of ways, with the 
most significant impacts for the community coming in the form of unnecessary delays, uncertainty, 
excessive compliance costs and regulatory spread. 
Delays 
Unnecessary delays to approvals, decisions and other regulatory processes are a major deterrent 
to investment and economic growth, with significant costs for the community and government. For 
example:  
• The Productivity Commission has found that expediting the average approval process for oil and 
gas projects would increase the value of projects by 10 to 20 per cent with billions of dollars of 
income gains for Australians.30 
• At a coking coal price of $200 a tonne, a 12-month delay to a 10 million tonne per annum export 
coking coal mine in Queensland would reduce Queensland Government mining royalty revenue 
by $170 million.31 
  
 
29. J. Vinals & J. Fiechter , The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say “No”, IMF, 2010, p. 4. 
30. Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) Sector, 2009, p. 197. 
31. BCA calculation based on Queensland royalty rate of 7% of value up to $100 million and 10% value above $100 million. 
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Uncertainty 
Consistency and predictability regarding regulatory processes, timing and outcomes are critically 
important factors that not only influence business decision-making, but also serve to bolster or 
undermine the credibility of the regulator in executing its responsibilities. As Christine Varney, 
former Assistant Attorney-General of the United States Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division 
has remarked:  
Regardless of the substantive outcome of a government investigation, it is important that parties 
involved know that the process used to reach that outcome was fair. The two concerns – substance 
and process – go hand in hand. Complaints about process lead to concern that substantive results are 
flawed, whereas a fair, predictable, and transparent process bolsters the legitimacy of the substantive 
outcome. Both are important.32 
Consequently, while it is more difficult to measure, uncertainty over timeframes for decisions, or the 
approach that a regulator will take in a particular matter, can be a major impediment to innovation, 
investment and job creation.  
Excessive compliance costs 
Where the regulator takes an excessive approach to enforcement, compliance and its  
information- gathering powers the cost to the community of regulation will be higher than 
anticipated.  
These compliance costs can also be exacerbated by a lack of delineation between the roles of 
regulators, lack of clarity over their powers and objectives, as well as a lack of coordination 
between regulators. The attitude of the regulator to the industry subject to regulation also has a 
major impact. 
Regulatory spread 
While increasing regulation is often driven by legislators in meeting political imperatives, regulatory 
spread occurs as regulators make a concerted effort to expand their powers to fulfil what they 
consider to be their rightful objectives.33  
This form of increased regulatory burden is particularly insidious as it is less easy to quantify and 
increases incrementally, as highlighted by former Trade Practices Commissioner Warren Pengilley:  
A particular problem in evaluating regulatory spread is to ascertain the true reason for the imposition of 
regulation in the first place. Regulators are anxious to point out that parliament has bestowed upon 
them certain powers and that they, the regulators, are but the passive recipients of that power and the 
instruments through which the parliamentary will is carried out. On the other hand, it is clear that it is 
frequently the regulator which approaches the relevant minister, often privately, to seek a bestowal of 
greater regulatory power. Distinguishing the two cases is usually difficult and often impossible by 
reference to any verifiable material, oral or written.34 
In addition, the precursor to a regulator gaining additional powers can involve vigorous testing of 
the limits of existing powers against business through the courts, even where it is expensive and 
the outcome is highly uncertain. 
  
 
32. C. Varney, ‘Procedural Fairness’, Speech to the 13th Annual Competition Conference of the International Bar 
Association, Fiesole, Italy, 12 September 2009. 
33. C. Berg, The Growth of Australia’s Regulatory State, IPA, 2008. 
34. W. Pengilley, ‘Competition Regulation in Australia: A Discussion of a Spider Web and its Weaving’, 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal, Vol. 8, 2001, p. 13. 
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Recent growth in the resources of regulators 
Just as regulatory reform efforts have had a limited focus on the performance and accountability 
framework of regulators, regulators in Australia have grown at a relatively rapid rate. 
While there is no consolidated information on the resources of Australia’s different business 
regulators at the Commonwealth and state levels, the sample of 10 significant Commonwealth 
Government regulators outlined in Table 1, demonstrates the robust growth in the resources 
available to regulators over the last decade. Between 2001–02 and 2011–12, expenditure for 
these regulators grew by over 75 per cent, while the number of staff employed increased by around 
27 per cent.  
Table 1: Sample of 10 significant Commonwealth Government Regulators 
Regulator Expenditure ($000) Total staff 
 2001–02 2011–12 2001–02 2011–12 
Australian Customs Service^  706,842  1,135,400  4,891   5,671 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority^  71,530   169,400   243   332 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority  59,231   121,119 424  624 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission  159,900   384,488   1,284   1,738  
Civil Aviation Safety Authority^  106,819  173,498   727  818 
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines 
Authority^ 
 20,623   30,332   129   181  
Australian Taxation Office^  2,028,311   3,444,183   19,318   22,315  
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission^  72,185   179,063   540   876  
Australian Communications and Media Authority*^  57,357*  112,769   486   618  
Australian Fisheries Management Authority^  27,688   38,378   128   205  
Total: 3,310,486 5,788,630 28,170 33,378 
Source: Regulator annual reports. Note: ^Total staff reported based on total employees as at the end of the 
financial year. For APRA, total employees applies to 2009–10, with FTE excluding casuals reported from 2010–11 
onwards. For ASIC, staff numbers are based on an FTE average over the year. *Based on combined expenditure of 
previously unmerged Australian Communications Authority and Australian Broadcasting Authority). 
The current lack of transparency in this area is illustrated by the recent Commonwealth 
Government initiatives directed at the reform of regulators. These included a commitment to 
publish a consolidated list of Commonwealth regulators, which currently doesn’t exist. 
Growth of key regulators 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the ACCC and ASIC grew at an average annual rate in excess of the 
Commonwealth Budget over the last 10 years. This expenditure is funded in some cases by 
government tax revenues and in others by levies and charges on regulated parties. 
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Figure 2: Average annual expenditure growth 2003 to 2013 
(% nominal) 
 
Source: Regulator Annual Reports and Final Budget Outcome 2012–13. ACCC includes AER. 
Similarly, these regulators experienced substantial growth in staff numbers, with ASIC and the 
ACCC outstripping the rate of employment growth across the broader economy during the same 
period, although there has been some moderation in recent years, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Index of employment growth: Economy vs regulators 
 
Source: Regulator annual reports and ABS cat. no. 6202.0. 
Note: ATO, ACCC and APRA data are total employees as at end of financial year, except APRA data for 2010–11, 
2011–12 and 2012–13 which exclude casual staff. ASIC staff numbers are full-time equivalent averages over the 
year. ACCC includes establishment of the AER in 2005–06. 
Implications of the rapid growth of regulators 
Some growth in these regulators over the last 10 years can be explained by historical events and 
the government’s response – for example the collapse of HIH in 2001 obviously changed the 
regulatory landscape significantly for ASIC and APRA. More recently, the global financial crisis has 
had a profound impact on the regulatory landscape for ASIC and APRA.  
In addition, the ongoing growth in the economy and the increasing sophistication of product 
markets during this time, particularly in areas like financial services, could be expected to alter the 
role and duties of regulators and it is incredibly important that these markets are orderly and well 
functioning. As APRA also suggests, its expenditure per dollar of assets supervised across the 
economy has remained relatively stable over a number of years.35 
In the case of the ACCC, it is important to note that it has taken on the newly established Australian 
Energy Regulator and other new regulatory responsibilities with the introduction of the Australian 
Consumer Law during this time.36 
Increased expenditure could also be justified by more timely regulatory decisions, but there is no 
evidence that increased expenditure has necessarily been accompanied by increased timeliness. 
It is also notable that expenditure has moderated for some of these regulators in recent years as 
the fiscal position comes under greater pressure. 
 
35. APRA, 2011–12 Annual Report, October 2012. 
36. It has not been possible based on publicly available information to isolate the growth of the ACCC over this period, 
excluding the AER. However, calculating growth from a more consistent starting point when the AER was established in 
2005–06 still yields expenditure and employment growth rates of a significant magnitude. For example, expenditure 
grew at an average nominal rate of 11.2 per cent per annum between 2005–06 and 2012–13. 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
180 
200 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
180 
200 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 
ATO ACCC ASIC APRA Total economy 
Index (2002-03=100) Index (2002-03=100) 
Business Council of Australia  38 
Notwithstanding these factors, the significant growth in regulatory capacity over 10 years that 
outstrips broader growth in government expenditure and the economy more generally does not 
appear to have been accompanied by a strengthening of the performance and accountability 
framework for these regulators.  
Significant growth, if left unchecked over a long period, may raise concerns for a number of 
reasons: 
• Even if there is more regulatory capacity than necessary, it will likely be utilised – leading to 
increased regulatory costs in the community 
− Like any organisation, a regulator faces strong incentives to grow and extend its reach. As 
suggested by a former British Prime Minister it is “... part of the DNA of regulatory bodies that 
they acquire their own interests and begin to grow.”37  
− Once established to perform a particular duty, there is little incentive for regulators to moderate 
their enforcement and compliance activities at any point in time, or to lightly regulate emerging 
issues. As the Banks Regulation Taskforce suggested, regulators operate in an environment in 
which “... any adverse event with the regulator’s field of influence is held up publicly as a 
‘failure’”.38 
• A risk-based approach may not be being adopted widely enough 
− Such an approach would allow regulators to reallocate resources and respond to new risks 
without increasing resources as substantially. 
• Increasing resources may never satisfy regulatory demands 
− Despite the considerable increases outlined, the IMF recently recommended the government 
should increase funding to ASIC.39 The  previous government rejected the IMF’s suggestion. 
− Expenditure at the Australian Communications and Media Authority has almost doubled in the 
last decade following the merger of the previously separate communications and media 
authorities. This did not stop recent government reviews proposing the establishment of a new 
super-regulator for the media. 
• Costs add up over time 
− If current trends continue for the ATO, ASIC, ACCC and APRA for the next decade, then there 
would be around $3 billion in additional expenditure each year by 2023 – on account of just four 
regulators.40 In some cases, it will be regulated parties that bear this cost through charges and 
levies.  
 
 
37. T. Blair, ‘Common Sense Culture, not a Compensation Culture’, Speech to Institute for Public Policy Research, 
26 May 2005. 
38. Regulation Taskforce, Rethinking Regulation: Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, 
January 2006, p. 159. 
39. IMF, Australia: IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation – Detailed Assessment of Implementation, 
2012. 
40. BCA calculation based on current expenditure in 2011–12 increasing at the same average annual rate that it has in the 
10 years to 2011–12. 
Recommendation 2: The Commonwealth Government should publish consolidated 
information on the resources of its regulators on an annual basis, including how they are 
funded. 
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Performance and accountability framework for regulators 
Standards for effective regulation 
As noted in Part 1, the BCA considers that a fundamental principle for an efficient regulatory 
system must be that regulations are administered in the most effective manner possible to facilitate 
economic progress. 
This refers to the exercise of powers and discretion in such a way that the regulator achieves the 
intended policy or legislative outcome, while avoiding unexpected consequences or over-
regulation. 
This general principle is underpinned by the following eight ‘Regulator Standards’ that we believe 
represent best practice in this area: 
1. Regulators are subject to regular and meaningful performance assessment and reporting. 
2. The government’s expectations of a regulator are transparent, and are clearly within the scope 
of the regulator’s powers. 
3. Regulators follow a risk-based approach to enforcement and compliance activities. 
4. Regulatory decisions are timely. 
5. Regulators are continuously streamlining their processes. 
6. Regulators adopt a client-focused approach to regulated parties. 
7. There is clear separation of roles between policymakers and regulators. 
8. Regulatory decisions are fair and contestable. 
Selection of agencies for review 
As discussed above, in undertaking this desktop review we have selected a sample of four key 
Commonwealth regulators as outlined below. 
Australian Taxation Office 
The ATO is the principle revenue collection agency of the Commonwealth Government. It is also 
responsible for the administration of important aspects of the superannuation system, the operation 
of the Australian Valuation Office and the Australian Business Register.  
Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
ASIC is responsible for the regulation of Australian companies, financial markets, financial services 
organisations and professionals who deal and advise in investments, superannuation, insurance, 
deposit taking and credit.  
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
The ACCC is an independent Commonwealth statutory authority whose role is to enforce the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (the CCA) and a range of additional legislation, promoting 
competition, fair trading and regulating national infrastructure. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
APRA is the prudential regulator of the Australian financial services industry. It oversees banks, 
credit unions, building societies, general insurance and reinsurance companies, life insurance, 
friendly societies, and most members of the superannuation industry. APRA is funded largely by 
the industries that it supervises. 
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Why these regulators were chosen 
These regulators have been chosen because they have the most evolved governance frameworks 
of Australian regulatory agencies, and their performance is already subject to a high degree of 
public scrutiny. Consequently, the performance and accountability frameworks under which they 
operate should, ideally, set the benchmark for other regulators. 
They are also among the largest and most high-profile regulatory agencies, and the consequences 
of their decision-making processes have a far-reaching impact on the Australian economy. As a 
result, if the framework in which these regulators administer the rules has weaknesses, this is likely 
to have a greater overall impact on the way companies are able to do business in Australia. 
Furthermore, if weaknesses exist with respect to the performance and accountability frameworks 
applied to ‘the big four’, it seems likely these issues will be exacerbated in other regulatory bodies 
which receive less public scrutiny or have less sophisticated governance arrangements. 
Reviewing the current performance and accountability framework: aims and expectations 
The BCA undertook a desktop review and consultation with selected BCA members. It is not an 
exhaustive audit of the agencies’ performance and accountability frameworks. Our work relies 
primarily on 2011–12 data, with regulators’ annual reports for 2012–13 being released as this 
paper was being launched. 
We have taken account of the recommendations and outcomes of past regulatory reviews, in 
particular the Uhrig review and the Banks taskforce, to identify areas where room for improvement 
still exists, particularly with respect to policies or practices that deal with risk-based decision-
making, streamlining and activities aimed at improving transparency. 
The identification of areas for improvement does not imply that Australia’s regulatory system is at 
risk of failure. 
The weaknesses outlined here are also not necessarily the responsibility of the regulators. 
Policymakers and the community more generally need to take their share of responsibility for 
influencing and designing the legislative and other parameters within which regulators operate and 
against which their effectiveness is judged. As the Banks taskforce found, “... [regulators] are often 
criticised for doing the job government and the community expects them to do.”41 
We also recognise that there may be trade-offs between accountability and independence. We are 
in no way suggesting that improvements should compromise the independence of these regulators 
or their governance as statutory authorities. 
Nevertheless, we would like to see the performance and accountability framework for regulators 
fundamentally strengthened to conform with best practice. 
  
 
41. Regulation Taskforce, Rethinking Regulation: Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, 
January 2006, p. 159. 
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Regulator Standard 1: Regulators are subject to regular and meaningful 
performance assessment and reporting 
 
 
Needs improvement 
Summary of current arrangements 
While all four regulators are subject to a number of formal performance assessment and reporting 
processes, these processes exhibit a number of weaknesses, meaning that performance reporting 
does not provide a full and balanced picture of performance. 
Existing mechanisms 
Each of the four regulators is subject to various forms of formal performance assessment and 
reporting, including those outlined below. 
Publication of annual reports 
All four agencies are required to publish an annual report, which sets out the information against 
which their performance will be assessed by parliament. This includes a description of program 
deliverables and the agency’s performance against various key performance metrics such as client 
satisfaction levels, response times, the number of inquiries handled or enforcement actions 
undertaken. 
Appearance before parliamentary committees  
All four agencies appear before various parliamentary committees at which they are required to 
provide information or respond to questions from committee members. For example, in  
2011–2012, the four agencies made a number of appearances before parliamentary committees 
including: 
• The ATO appeared before three Senate Estimates Committee hearings and five other 
parliamentary committee hearings. 
• ASIC is subject to oversight by the Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 
which holds regular public hearings with ASIC and reports these findings to parliament. 
• The ACCC appeared before parliamentary committees on 11 occasions including several 
appearances before the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs. 
• APRA appeared or made submissions on more than 10 occasions before various parliamentary 
committees including the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
and the Senate Economic References Committee. 
Stakeholder surveys 
Three of the four agencies undertake stakeholder surveys on a regular basis; only the ACCC does 
not appear to do so. 
For example, APRA undertakes a stakeholder survey every two years in accordance with its client 
service charter and ASIC undertook an initial stakeholder survey in 2008, again in 2010 and 2013. 
Likewise, the ATO undertakes biennial professionalism surveys and business perception surveys. 
The results of these surveys are generally published on the agencies’ respective websites. 
Independent oversight 
Some regulators also have additional bodies that oversee their performance. For example, the 
government has announced that the ATO will be subject to the oversight of an independent tax 
system advisory board, in addition to the oversight of the Inspector-General of Taxation who has 
wide-ranging powers to examine systemic tax administration issues. 
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Court or tribunal adjudication 
Administrative decisions made by regulators may be challenged before independent tribunals or 
courts to determine their validity. In general, tribunal decisions are reviewed to determine whether 
or not they lack procedural fairness and if this is found to be the case, they are remitted to the 
regulator. Merits review before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is only available where it is 
specifically provided in the legislation governing the regulator’s decision-making. 
Acts of officials may also be brought before the courts and their actions may give rise to both 
civil or criminal liability, although in general public officials enjoy immunity where their actions are 
undertaken in the performance of their duties. These issues are analysed further at 
Regulator Standard 8. 
Shortcomings of current mechanisms 
There are a number of shortcomings with the current performance assessment mechanisms, which 
make regulators less accountable than they should be. 
Narrow focus on reporting metrics and a limited analysis of performance 
In relative terms Australia’s regulatory agencies often rank among the world’s best. For example, 
last year the ACCC was named the Global Competition Review’s ‘Agency of the Year’ for 
Asia Pacific and the Middle East42 and it regularly ranks among the top five or top 10 agencies 
globally. 
Nevertheless, any appraisal of a regulator’s performance is made difficult by the challenges 
associated with measuring and assessing performance in a meaningful way. 
The current performance and accountability framework for regulators is too narrow and tends to be 
driven by an “activity-oriented calculus.”43 In other words, currently the measurement of regulators’ 
performance tends to be driven by easily quantifiable variables, such as the number of 
enforcement actions or the timely completion of highly transactional activities. 
As Joanna Bird, a former Associate Professor at Sydney Law School and now a senior executive at 
ASIC suggests, “it is notoriously difficult to set meaningful performance measures or standards for 
regulators and to actually measure their substantive, as opposed to procedural or financial, 
performance.”44  
For instance, annual reports tend to focus on reporting regulatory ‘transactions’. All four agencies 
include information such as the number of inquiries or complaints received, response times and 
outcomes, compliance initiatives, summaries of enforcement proceedings and the quantum of any 
penalties imposed. 
One only has to consider media coverage of regulators to see the degree to which ‘big wins’ in 
court cases are treated as a measure of effective regulation. A recent article referring to ACCC 
Chairman Rod Sims included the suggestion from a former ACCC Chairman that the main criterion 
against which his tenure will be judged is the size and number of litigation cases: “... the jury is still 
out ... Sims needs to bag one or two big cases to truly make his mark.”45 
Limited attention is paid to assessing whether, in completing these tasks, the regulators have 
achieved the right regulatory balance – reducing risk while preventing impediments to economic 
progress. 
 
42. See http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-receives-international-agency-of-the-year-award-from-global-
competition-review. 
43. W. Kovacic, ‘Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?’, George Mason Law Review, 
Vol. 16:4, 2009, p. 908. 
44. J. Bird, ‘Regulating the Regulators: Accountability of Australian Regulators’, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 16, 
Issue 4, 2011, p. 745. 
45. P. Durkin, ‘Spare the Rod, Spoil the Competition’, The Australian Financial Review, 5 December 2012. 
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Likewise, these assessment methods offer a limited interrogation of, and response to, poor 
performance. One of the weaknesses of regulators’ stakeholder surveys is that while the results 
are made public, in most cases there is no meaningful response or specific remedial action 
proposed by the regulator in response to stakeholder perceptions of poor performance. There is 
not even further interrogation of the exact reasons why regulated parties have given the responses 
that they have. This would help to avoid the simple explanation that regulated parties will always 
complain about a regulator regardless of their conduct. 
There is no regular independent expert opinion regarding performance 
Regulators will at times be the subject of audits by the ANAO or investigation by the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman. In spite of this, their performance is not subject to regular 
independent review by an economic and regulatory expert body such as the Productivity 
Commission. Indeed, in 2006 the Banks regulatory taskforce acknowledged that a range of 
concerns regarding regulators had been brought to its attention but in the time available to it, 
it had not been able to complete a detailed assessment about the performance of particular 
regulators.46 
Regulatory experts have also been quick to point out that parliament is not necessarily well placed 
to monitor performance and that increased parliamentary scrutiny may encourage greater 
regulatory intervention to address short-term political pressures rather than more effective or 
measured intervention.47 
Consequently, it may be concluded that there is a preponderance of narrow and sometimes weak 
accountability mechanisms.48  
Previously, the Uhrig review had recommended the appointment of an Inspector-General of 
Regulation, based upon the existing model of the Inspector-General of Taxation. The role proposed 
for the Inspector-General of Regulation was to act as an objective and independent office to 
investigate nominated regulators’ systems and procedures. Uhrig considered this was needed to 
address deficiencies in the level of meaningful engagement between regulators and their regulated 
constituency, and to create a mechanism by which potential issues could be identified and 
addressed. 
This was the only recommendation put forward by the Uhrig review not endorsed by the 
government. At the time, it was felt that adoption of the other Uhrig recommendations was sufficient 
to ensure effective governance over regulators. 
Given the exponential growth in regulation and the expansion of regulators’ powers, it is 
appropriate to once again give consideration to implementing a more comprehensive ongoing 
assessment of regulators’ performance. Such an assessment would also assist in measuring 
performance against the other Regulator Standards discussed below. The BCA’s 
recommendations in this regard are provided at the conclusion of our assessment against the 
standards. 
  
 
46. Regulation Taskforce, Rethinking Regulation: Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, 
January 2006. 
47. A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, 2004. 
48. J. Bird, ‘Regulating the Regulators: Accountability of Australian Regulators’, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 16, 
Issue 4, 2011, p. 741: ‘Weak’ accountability mechanisms refers to those where a regulator is only required to explain 
and justify its actions, but does not require some response to under-performance. 
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Regulator Standard 2: The government’s expectations of a regulator are 
transparent, and are clearly within the scope of the regulator’s powers 
 
 
Best-practice 
mechanisms not being 
applied 
Summary of current arrangements 
Based on publicly available information, none of the regulators have clear ministerial expectations. 
There are no up-to-date statements of government expectations publicly available. 
Existing mechanisms 
An important outcome of the Uhrig review of public sector corporate governance was the 
recommendation that regulators receive a ministerial statement of expectation.  
The last publicly available statements of expectation from the government were issued to the 
regulators assessed here by the then Treasurer in early 2007. In response, regulators outlined their 
statement of intentions and submitted these to the then Treasurer. 
Shortcomings of current mechanisms 
Success for a regulator is often judged by how efficiently and effectively it achieves the objectives 
set by government and parliament. However, these objectives are often not clear or transparent for 
either the regulator or its stakeholders. 
As the Banks Taskforce suggested: 
These statements will provide scope to outline the government’s current objectives relevant to the 
authority and any expectations the government may have of how the authority should conduct its 
operations. They have the potential to be helpful and transparent vehicles for guiding a regulator’s 
approach – and simultaneously educating the community – without infringing on a regulator’s essential 
independence.49 
At the time there was a strong impetus to implement the recommendations of the Banks taskforce 
and Uhrig review on the governance of regulators. In this respect, it was recommended that the 
statements be updated annually.  
This best practice appears to have been abandoned in the intervening period. Since 2007, there 
has been a complete absence of published annual updates, over a period when there have been 
significant changes and developments for each of the regulators. For example, since 2007: 
• the ATO has been overseen by four different Assistant Treasurers 
• the ACCC and ASIC have new chairmen and both have had four different ministers responsible 
for their administration 
• There have been significant changes to the role of regulators. For example, the ACCC has new 
powers to pursue criminal price fixing cases, and changes to the laws regarding price signalling 
and the Australian Consumer Law have been introduced. Likewise, APRA’s role has been 
enhanced in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
It is encouraging that the current government has committed to enhancing the oversight of 
regulators in areas like this. 
The BCA notes that these practices are taken much more seriously in jurisdictions such as New 
Zealand (see Exhibit 3). 
 
49. ibid., p. 161. 
Business Council of Australia  45 
 
 
Regulator Standard 3: Regulators follow a risk-based approach to 
enforcement and compliance activities 
 
 
 
Needs improvement 
Summary of current mechanisms 
The extent of transparent risk-based approaches being adopted varies by regulator: 
• The ATO has one of the more well-developed and communicated risk-based approaches of the 
regulators surveyed, although by its nature it still has the potential to capture many large 
business taxpayers with a good compliance record in higher-risk quadrants. 
• APRA also has a relatively well-defined risk-based approach to its enforcement and compliance 
activities. 
• ASIC suggests that it takes a “proactive risk-based approach” but its risk framework is not 
necessarily transparent. 
• The ACCC communicates a relatively clear set of priorities but it does not appear to have an 
explicit risk-based approach to enforcement and compliance activities. 
Existing mechanisms 
ATO 
The ATO probably has the most developed risk-based approach of any of the regulators. The ATO 
adopts a systematic risk-management approach to its compliance activities and publishes details of 
this approach. The ATO’s Risk Differentiation Framework for large business is an example of this. 
The framework clearly outlines the risk filters it applies, with only 1.2 per cent of large businesses in 
the high-risk quadrant subject to continuous real-time tax reviews. 
APRA 
APRA has also adopted a risk-based approach to its supervisory activities, which is set out in 
The APRA Supervision Blueprint. APRA ‘... explicitly recognises the balance that must be struck 
between achieving a desired level of comfort regarding a supervised institution’s prudential 
soundness and the ability to pursue risk-based supervision.’50 APRA’s risk-based approach is 
supported by a Probability and Impact Rating System. 
ASIC 
 
50. APRA, The APRA Supervision Blueprint, January 2010, p. 5. 
Exhibit 3: Statements of Intention for New Zealand regulators 
In New Zealand, the requirement for regulators to prepare statements of intention has 
statutory backing under the Crown Entities Act 2004.  
The statement promotes public accountability by allowing the government to participate in 
setting its medium-term intentions and providing a base against which its performance can 
be assessed. 
The statement is prepared annually and covers at least three years’ future performance. 
Mandatory content of the statement includes how the entity proposes to manage the 
organisational health and the capability of the entity and a statement of forecast services for 
the first year covered by the statement. 
Source: Crown Entities Act 2004 (NZ). 
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ASIC has suggested in various documents that it takes a proactive risk-based approach to 
surveillance – including identifying, analysing and evaluating the risks in the regulated population 
and focusing surveillance on areas they consider to be the highest risk. ASIC also publishes 
information showing the surveillance coverage of each of its regulated populations, including the 
resourcing and the frequency of surveillance that can be expected in different sectors.  
ACCC 
The ACCC does not appear to have a systematic or explicit risk-based approach to its enforcement 
and compliance activities. Its Compliance and Enforcement Policy suggests a relatively flexible 
approach to determining its priorities. The policy suggests that the ACCC gives enforcement 
priority to matters that meet one or more of 12 criteria, some of which are relatively broad in nature 
(e.g. conduct involving a significant new or emerging market issue). Both the chairman and the 
policy document suggest the regulator’s focus as being on highly concentrated sectors, 
telecommunications, energy, online competition, carbon pricing, enforcing new consumer law 
provisions and protecting Indigenous consumers.  
Shortcomings of current mechanisms 
It would appear that at the very least there may be an opportunity for some regulators to better 
articulate the risk-based approach that they apply. 
While ASIC does actively consider risk in its regulatory model, its overall framework and process 
for assessing and analysing risk is not transparent, making it difficult to confirm that the regulator 
does actually adopt a risk-based approach. 
The ACCC may judge its priority areas as high-risk and deserving of the greatest compliance and 
enforcement focus and communicate this to the public, but how it arrived at this list and how it 
intends to pursue a risk-based approach within these sectors is far from transparent. In fairness to 
the regulator, this may be at least partially explained by the complexity of competition policy and 
determining accurately where particular activities are more or less likely to jeopardise the 
competitive process. 
 
Regulator Standard 4: Regulatory decisions are timely  
 
Needs improvement 
Summary of current arrangements 
Most regulators report at a high-level that their regulatory decisions are timely. However, we have 
found: 
• A lack of transparency of the distribution of performance for the timeliness of regulatory 
decisions, particularly for those cases exceeding service standards. 
• A lack of strong incentives for timeliness, particularly for minimising further delay once a deadline 
has already been exceeded for decision. 
Existing mechanisms 
The ATO and ASIC both have significant volumes of financial transactions, enquiries and 
registrations, with relatively clear service standards under their service charters, which they report 
on annually. 
Given that the majority of these sorts of transactions are relatively simple, it should not be 
surprising that both regulators’ overall performance against the standards is relatively positive. 
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For example in 2011–12, the ATO met 20 of its 22 service standards.51 ASIC managed to complete 
transactions like registering a business in one business day in 98 per cent of cases.52 
The ACCC also has a number of clearly defined key performance indicators for the timeliness of 
decisions, although its reporting of performance against these is less systematic than the ATO and 
ASIC. 
APRA has less clearly defined measurable service standards for timeliness and they report less on 
timeliness, but this largely reflects their fundamentally different role and activities.  
Shortcomings of current mechanisms 
Although regulators report high-level performance statistics that suggest the vast majority of their 
decisions are timely, there remain a number of systemic weaknesses in the decision-making 
framework. These relate in particular to a lack of clear incentives to minimise the delays brought 
about by contentious or complex decisions, especially where these have already exceeded general 
timelines. 
The timelines for decisions are rarely legislated and even if they are, the regulator retains 
considerable flexibility 
Many of the service charters that the regulators have prepared contain self-determined timeframes 
within which they aspire to respond to queries or make decisions. However, there is no direct 
penalty or other negative outcome for regulators that do not meet these self-determined 
timeframes. Rather, any frustration or negative outcome caused by the delay falls on the regulated 
parties. 
There is limited interrogation of ‘outlier’ decisions 
This is particularly important if the regulator has a poor-performing tail for timeliness of approvals, 
with important decisions for regulated parties falling significantly beyond the standard timeframes.  
For example, in its 2010–11 Annual Report, the ACCC reports on its “prompt and effective” 
assessment of mergers, with 84 per cent of merger reviews concluded in less than eight weeks. 
These statistics will mean little to the remaining 16 per cent of regulated parties who experience 
delays in some cases well beyond these already generous timeframes. For example, the  
Austar–Foxtel merger took almost 12 months from announcement to final approval. 
Greater transparency and reporting of the extent of delays and the nature of decisions that have 
not met deadlines may not necessarily increase compliance, but it should provide increased 
accountability and an incentive on regulators to lift overall timeliness and reduce the extent of the 
delays they experience beyond deadlines. 
Lack of incentives 
There are limited incentives for regulators to resolve matters quickly once a deadline has been 
exceeded. In fact, for extremely complex or contentious matters there may be an incentive on the 
regulator to stall or frustrate efforts as long as possible so that the regulated party withdraws from 
the process or agrees to negotiate concessions. For these sorts of cases, there is a need for some 
form of stop-gap – for example a point of such delay that the regulatory decision is deemed 
approved. Other jurisdictions adopt such mechanisms for merger decisions (see Exhibit 4). This will 
no doubt be considered in the upcoming review of competition policy. 
 
51. ATO, Commissioner of Taxation Annual Report 2011–12, October 2012, p. 16. 
52. ASIC, ASIC Service Charter Results, viewed 15 November 2013, 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/Service+charter+results?openDocument>. 
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Exhibit 4: Merger review timeframes 
Merger transactions are nearly always time critical – the longer it takes to close a deal, the 
greater the cost and disruption to the business of the merging parties and the greater the risk 
the deal will not close. 
To reduce the risk of this occurring, the regulatory assessment of a deal’s effects on 
competition needs to be completed within a reasonable time period.  This is recognised by 
the International Competition Network (ICN) – the international forum for competition 
agencies, of which the ACCC is a founding member.  In its Recommended Practices for 
Merger Notification Procedures, the ICN recommends that, ‘review periods should be subject 
to definitive and readily-ascertainable deadlines’.  It recommends that “initial waiting periods 
should expire in six weeks or less, and extended or ‘Phase II’ reviews [where an in-depth 
analysis of complex issues is needed] should be completed or capable of completion within 
six months or less following the submission of the initial notification.”   
This practice is followed in many major economies where merger reviews are subject to 
prescribed periods in which the competition agency must issue a decision, e.g. to clear the 
deal, to open a ‘Phase II’ inquiry or (rarely in the initial investigation) to block the deal.  If no 
decision of any kind is issued within the prescribed period, then the transaction is deemed to 
have been approved by the regulator (e.g. this is the case in the US and the EU as well as 
EU Member States such as Germany and France).  This imposes deadlines to assess the 
deal and make a decision, and in turn this creates greater transparency around the review 
process.   
In Australia, by contrast, the timelines for review (both formal and informal) are non-binding 
and come with the qualification that: 
Indicative timelines are published by the ACCC to give the merger parties and the public the best 
possible guide to the likely timing of an informal merger review. However, these timelines are 
subject to review and amendment where circumstances require, such as when a Statement of 
Issues is published [...] the information set out below should be used only as a guide to the 
possible stages in an informal merger review.  
(ACCC Merger Review Process Guidelines 2013, p. 11.) 
This flexibility can be useful to a degree, if it results in faster decisions and fewer information 
requirements in straightforward cases.  However, the benefits of flexibility should not come at 
the cost of lower levels of certainty around the timing of decisions – flexibility should not be 
used as a justification for delay. 
According to analysis by Gilbert + Tobin, the average time taken for the ACCC to complete a 
public merger review rose approximately 45 per cent in 2012 compared to 2011 (from 65 to 
94 calendar days) and has more than doubled since 2009. 
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Regulator Standard 5: Regulators are continuously streamlining their processes 
 
 
 
Absence of 
supporting 
initiatives 
Summary of current arrangements 
There does not appear to be evidence to suggest that any of the four regulators have been 
effective in continuously streamlining their processes. 
Existing mechanisms 
In general, the BCA has found that while regulators often report a number of initiatives being 
undertaken to streamline their processes and reduce regulatory burden on business, the results 
are not being felt on the ground by regulated parties. For example: 
• ASIC has a performance outcome of “streamlined and cost-effective interaction” and 72 per cent 
of all its forms are lodged online. Despite this, ASIC’s most recently published stakeholder survey 
suggested that only 11 per cent of people agreed that ASIC has reduced regulatory red tape.53 
• APRA has been involved in a number of online initiatives to streamline its processes, including 
Standard Business Reporting. Despite this, recent stakeholder surveys have suggested the one 
area in which APRA’s stakeholder rating is lower than neutral is in the area of consideration of 
the costs of regulation to industry in changes to the prudential framework.54 
• Only 37 per cent of businesses surveyed in the ATO’s most recent Business Perceptions Survey 
felt that completing business tax returns was easier than in past years.55 
Shortcomings of current mechanisms 
Benefits of streamlining are not being felt by regulated parties 
As noted above, the effects of streamlining are often not felt by regulated parties. 
In other cases, initiatives appear to fall by the wayside following their introduction. For example, in 
2006 ASIC announced its Better Regulation initiative. While many of these initiatives were 
introduced, we could find no evidence of further streamlining, or any kind of appraisal of their 
effectiveness. Streamlining is an iterative process, rather than a one-off event, and consequently, 
we would expect that further, incremental improvements could be identified and implemented. 
Streamlining should not be at the cost of regulated parties 
The BCA considers that streamlined effective processes should be an objective of regulators and a 
right of regulated parties that reasonably seek to comply with the law. However, at times regulators 
are prone to suggest that regulated parties must give up something in return for the privilege of 
streamlined processes, whether this is a cost-recovery fee or greater information.  
Regulated parties should cooperate with regulators in their efforts to streamline processes 
wherever it is feasible and cost-effective to do so. Additionally, there will be circumstances in which 
cost-recovery may be appropriate. However, the extra cost of streamlined processes should not 
necessarily be borne by regulated parties and the offer of streamlined processes should not be 
conducted as a negotiation or something that may be withdrawn at any point. 
  
 
53. Susan Bell Research, ASIC Stakeholder Survey 2013, September 2013, p. 67. 
54. APRA, APRA Stakeholder Survey 2011 – Report of Overall Findings 2011, July 2011. 
55. Ipsos–Eureka Social Research Institute Project, Business Perceptions Survey Wave 16 Full Report, May 2010, p. 11. 
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For example, last year the ACCC put forward a fast-track protocol to deal with supermarket 
acquisitions. According to the ACCC:  
In return for advanced notice of a wider range of acquisitions, and for particular information being 
provided upfront with each transaction, [the ACCC] would establish a dedicated team to assess these 
transactions within specified times. [...] With repeated transactions in local markets [the ACCC’s] 
processes can be streamlined. This can, however, only occur with appropriate notification, co-operation 
and upfront information. Unless and until some new arrangements are put in place, however, our 
review of those local acquisitions we become aware of will continue under current processes.56 
The BCA queries why in this case the establishment of a dedicated team by the ACCC requires a 
quid pro quo from the supermarkets. The use of ACCC staff with previous sectoral experience 
would be a more efficient approach with or without the provision of additional upfront information, 
and it begs the question why the ACCC would not do so in any case. 
 
Regulator Standard 6: Clear separation of roles between policymakers 
and regulators 
 
 
Needs 
improvement 
Summary of current arrangements 
While all four regulators are structurally independent of the policymaking process, there is room for 
better checks and balances to ensure that regulators limit their role appropriately in relation to 
policy matters, with regulation-making powers granted selectively and used judiciously. 
Existing mechanisms 
Unlike a number of smaller government regulators, the regulators considered here are structurally 
independent of the policymaking process, and each has been established as a statutory authority 
that is a separate legal entity to the Commonwealth. This gives appropriate independence to the 
regulator to administer and in some cases make delegated legislative instruments, such as 
regulations and determinations, without interference from the government.  
At the same time, there are some checks and balances on the independence of regulators, 
although in practice these are rarely utilised; for example, parliament can disallow legislative 
instruments made by regulators, and in some cases a minister has directions power. In the case of 
ASIC and APRA this power is limited to policies they should pursue or priorities they should follow 
rather than direction about a particular case. 
Based on publicly available information, there are certainly no concerns that the independence of 
these large regulators is in any way under threat.  
Shortcomings of current mechanisms 
There are legitimate questions to be asked about whether or not regulators exercise undue 
influence over policymaking, particularly in light of the rapid increase in regulation and resources of 
regulators noted earlier. 
While the views and expertise of regulators should be taken into account in making policy and they 
may provide useful evidence to government of the need for change, the BCA does not believe that 
they should be the primary drivers of change.  
  
 
56. R. Sims, ‘Better Communicating the ACCC’s role, Its Approach to Reviewing Mergers Involving Small Retail 
Acquisitions and the Benefits of Competition in Electricity’, Speech to CEDA, Sydney, 14 June 2012. 
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In this context it is notable that former head of the Commonwealth Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, Peter Shergold, recently remarked in relation to the Chairmen of ASIC and APRA 
that: 
... They certainly seem to be speaking in ways that are actually making public policy ... 
When both Laker and Medcraft speak they have a significant impact on business and, on occasion, 
unwittingly increase the level of investment uncertainty.57 
Resolving whether certain regulators are exercising undue influence over policymaking will 
certainly be highly contested, particularly by the regulator in question. Nevertheless, there appear 
to be two trends that could be driving increased potential for regulators to exercise undue influence 
over policymaking: 
• Increasing technical complexity and pressures on government to progress regulatory solutions to 
problems quickly means that in some instances there may be pressure to delegate more 
regulation making to regulators and increase their scope of powers for certain matters. This can 
increase the risk of policymaking in effect being delegated or a regulator’s actions having the 
same impact as policy change. 
• Regulators are increasingly using the media and other public devices to educate, raise public 
awareness and put their concerns about emerging regulatory issues on the public record, which 
can then draw comments on policy matters.  
Risks of increased regulator involvement in policy 
It is appropriate for regulators to have some flexibility and a capacity to make regulations in 
particular circumstances. However, over time it becomes very difficult to identify the point at which 
regulation making does indeed become policymaking. 
Various studies have identified the risks in combining policy and regulatory functions, including:58 
• Increased potential for regulatory creep, due to a tendency for a regulator to align policy with its 
overarching interest to maintain or expand its role. 
• Potential for regulator to be drawn into the political process and compromise its perceived or 
actual independence. 
• Increased likelihood of a narrow policy perspective being applied by a regulator. 
Use of the media by regulators will sometimes lead to questions of these regulators about the need 
for policy change or increased powers. In the absence of a public counter view from government, 
this can focus public debate on regulatory options put forward by the regulator before a proper 
analysis of the problem has been undertaken. 
The use of delegated legislative instruments, other regulatory guidance and powers 
Use of legislative instruments 
The delegation of legislative instruments is not new and has been the subject of analysis for some 
time now.59 Delegating detailed technical issues to instruments brings advantages like greater 
flexibility to change over time. It is also well established that regulators have the ability to develop 
instruments within defined legislative powers. For example, the Memorandum of Understanding 
between Treasury and APRA suggests that:  
 
57. AFR Magazine Power, Issue 2012, 28 September 2012. 
58. UK Better Regulation Task Force, Avoiding Regulatory Creep, 2004 and State Services Authority (Victoria), 
Review of the Rationalisation and Governance of Regulators: Final Report, April 2009. 
59. See for example S. Bottomley, ‘Where Did the Law Go? The Delegation of Australian Corporate Regulation’, 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 15, 2003. 
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APRA is established by statute as an independent regulatory agency and so it too has a policy role, but 
one primarily related to the exercise of its powers conferred under the various laws for which it has 
administrative responsibility.60 
To this end APRA sets the prudential standards, which are legally binding and form the basis of its 
supervisory approach.  
On average, the Commonwealth has made around 330 legislative legislative instruments each year 
over the last decade.61 While the Commonwealth Government does publish its legislative 
instruments, there is currently no function to disaggregate these instruments according to the 
responsible regulator. In the absence of this data, the BCA is unable to verify whether the number 
of instruments made by the regulators in particular has increased in recent times. 
Quasi-regulatory documents 
The flexibility and discretion of regulators tends to extend further with quasi-regulatory documents 
having a significant effect on how the broad intention of legislation is ultimately enacted.  
For example, ASIC has well over 200 active regulatory guides,62 which by their very nature 
represent more than just ‘hints and tips’, including by describing how ASIC will exercise its powers 
and how ASIC interprets the law. The significant impact of these documents as part of the 
regulatory environment is evidenced by the fact that some are subject to Regulation Impact 
Statements.  
Granting of broad powers 
Regulators also have a significant impact through administrative processes. For example, under 
the ACCC’s merger review process, there is no legal requirement for transacting parties to obtain 
ACCC approval. Instead, over time an informal merger notification process has emerged as the 
principal method of reviewing the competitive effects of a deal. These informal decisions are not 
subject to administrative review by the Australian Competition Tribunal, and the formal merger 
process, under which decisions are reviewable, has never been used. Consequently, interpretation 
of section 50 of the CCA has been left almost entirely to the ACCC.63 
There have also been more recent proposals for policymakers to grant significant powers to 
regulators that if used could have a dramatic impact on the regulatory environment. For example 
the Council of Financial Regulators recently proposed to grant ASIC the explicit power to:  
… direct a licensed market operator [such as the ASX] to make listing rules with specified content, with 
the consent of the minister, where ASIC views that the making of that rule is appropriate and 
proportionate for the enhancement and/or protection of market integrity.64 
As a general rule, delegating regulation-making or broad powers to the regulator should be avoided 
or the scope of matters delegated to regulators for regulation making limited wherever possible. 
This also highlights the need for checks and balances on such powers to ensure that regulators do 
not exceed their mandate over time. For example: 
• The boundaries of regulator discretion and regulation making need to be clearly defined. 
• Ministers and policy agencies should carefully monitor the regulation-making activities (including 
quasi-regulation) of regulators. 
 
60. Memorandum of Understanding between Treasury and APRA, p. 1. 
61. BCA calculations based on Federal Register of Legislative Instruments as at June 2013, viewed 15 November 2013, 
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Browse/ByTitle/LegislativeInstruments/Current#top>. 
62. For regulatory guides, see <https://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/Regulatory+guides?openDocument#>, 
viewed 15 November 2013. 
63. There have been only two section 50 cases heard by the Federal Court in the past 10 years: AGL v ACCC (No 3) [2003] 
FCA 1525 (19 December 2003) and ACCC v Metcash Trading Limited [2011] FCAFC 151. 
64. Council of Financial Regulators, Review of Financial Market Infrastructure Regulation, Consultation Paper, October 
2011, p. 29. 
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If ministers and agencies are not adequately equipped or sufficiently independent to undertake this 
role, then it could be undertaken under the Inspector-General of Regulation model canvassed later 
in this section. 
Regulators seeking to drive policy change 
A recent example on the second of these trends relates to the debate about auditor quality in 
Australia. Following the release of its two most recent 18-monthly audit inspection reports which 
show a decline in the performance of external auditors, the industry has been issued with a 
warning from ASIC that if performance does not improve, the regulator will recommend a 
mandatory audit firm rotation policy to government.65  
In addition, ASIC has been active in pushing for changes to takeovers policy and suggesting online 
tests for people investing in complex financial products. This relatively proactive approach to 
influencing policy is in contrast to the former ASIC Commissioner Tony D’Aloisio, who in one of his 
final interviews before stepping down from ASIC commented: 
I try to separate the law, the policy of the law and the way ASIC enforces it. At the end of the day, ASIC 
is a regulator. It enforces the law as it finds it.66 
While it is inevitable that changes to legislation will be required over time to ensure a fair and 
competitive business environment, the BCA would prefer to see changes to the law initiated at the 
government level rather than at the regulator level.  
The role of the regulator should be focused on administering regulation through encouraging 
compliance, education and enforcement. It should also bring emerging issues and evidence to light 
through its technical expertise to inform government decision-making. However, it should not be 
the chief public agitator for policy change.  
Governments must also play their part, by taking active leadership of the policy agenda. 
 
Regulator Standard 7: Regulators adopt a client-focused approach to regulated 
parties   
Needs 
improvement 
Summary of current arrangements 
The BCA finds that regulators assessed have in place a range of formal mechanisms that are 
consistent with and acknowledge the importance of a client-focused approach. There are, however, 
signs across all regulators that these formal mechanisms are not doing enough to support a client-
focused approach to regulated parties.  
Existing mechanisms 
It is important to note upfront that adopting a client-focused approach to regulated parties does not 
and should not detract from compliance with the law. This standard requires a client-focused 
approach to minimising as far as possible the costs and complexity involved in complying with the 
law. As the Banks taskforce suggested, there is a need to ensure impartial decision-making, but 
effective communication can help regulators to perform better and support business confidence in 
the regulatory environment. 
Table 3 highlights some of the formal mechanisms that regulators have in place to provide a client-
focused approach to regulated parties. In summary: 
• All of the regulators have some form of client service charter. 
 
65. P. Durkin, ‘ASIC Threatens Auditors with Mandatory Rotation’, The Australian Financial Review, 5 December 2012. 
66. Z. Efrat, ‘Q&A with Tony D’Aloisio’, Company Director, March 2011, p. 26. 
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• Each of the regulators has relatively clear instructions for how regulated parties should approach 
the regulator with complaints. 
• All of the regulators have a range of consultative forums and advisory groups designed to 
increase their understanding of the regulated population and provide feedback. 
 
 
Table 2: Mechanisms supporting a client-focused approach 
Regulator Mechanisms  
ACCC ACCC Service Charter 
• Outlines service commitments regarding quality of service and responsiveness, and 
avenues of complaint if clients are dissatisfied with the service they receive. 
Complaints handling 
• Complaints about how the ACCC has handled a matter are to be brought to the attention of 
a more senior ACCC staff member or directly to the CEO. There are no further guidelines or 
timelines provided. 
• Complaints may also be lodged with external bodies including the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, the Privacy Commissioner, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal or the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunities Commissioner. 
Client relations 
• The ACCC participates in a number of consultative forums including the Consumer, Health 
Sector, Infrastructure, Fuel, Small Business, Franchising and Wholesale 
Telecommunications Consultative Committees. 
ASIC Client Service Charter 
• Service Charter outlining expectations that regulated parties and clients should have of the 
regulator. The charter has a range of targets, performance against which is measured and 
reported on an annual basis. 
Complaints handling 
• ASIC has avenues to discuss its decisions and will provide reasons for their decision in 
writing, upon request. Parties must do this within 28 days of being told about the decision. 
• Complaints about how ASIC has handled a matter are to be brought to the attention of a 
more senior ASIC staff member than the officer with whom you have been dealing. There 
are no further guidelines or timelines provided. 
• Complaints about staff can be lodged with ASIC’s Professional Standards Unit. ASIC will 
acknowledge receipt of complaints in writing within 14 working days of receipt. ASIC 
suggests that it will resolve complaints as promptly as possible but different procedures will 
apply depending on the seriousness of the allegation. 
Client relations 
• ASIC has an External Advisory Panel to better understand the market it operates.  
• ASIC has regular dialogue with industry groups and lists the number of meetings it has 
annually in its surveillance coverage of regulated populations – for example, in 2011–12 it 
had 67 industry meetings with financial advisers. 
ATO Client Service Charter 
• Taypayers’ Charter, which includes the ATO’s approach to dealing with taxpayers, along 
with the obligations of taxpayers. 
• The ATO also has 21 Service Standards, primarily relating to timeframes in which it will 
complete a range of transactional activities. On its year-to-date performance it has met 19 of 
21 standards. 
Complaints handling 
• Under the ATO complaints system, initial contact from the responsible officer in the ATO will 
occur within three days of the complaint being lodged. 
Client relations 
• Operates a range of consultative forums with business where systemic issues can be raised 
–  for example, the large business advisory group with senior ATO members. 
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Regulator Mechanisms  
APRA Client Service Charter 
• APRA operates according to a service charter. 
Complaints handling 
• Handles complaints according to Australian Standard on Customer Satisfaction (ISO 
10002:2006) and the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Better Practice Guide to Complaint 
Handling. Complaints are responded to within 15 working days. 
Client relations 
• Appoints a ‘Responsible Supervisor’ for each entity that it regulates. This role is designed to 
maintain a network of relationships across both the entity and APRA. Regulated companies 
can make any complaints through this supervisor. In its 2011 Stakeholder Survey, regulated 
entities strongly supported its one ‘Responsible Supervisor’ model. 
Source: Regulator websites and annual reports. 
Shortcomings of current mechanisms 
Client service charters 
Most of these service charters are focused on what the regulator will do to provide what it 
considers to be an acceptable level of service. In some cases this leads to a highly transactional 
target approach as evident in the performance reporting of regulators – for example, ASIC’s 
Charter is largely concerned with the most common interactions that ASIC has with regulated 
parties and how quickly ASIC will respond.  
The flaw in all of these charters, with the possible exception of APRA, is that they don’t have the 
client as the starting point. For example, as a fundamental starting point for better service, none of 
the charters suggest that the regulator will ensure that they have a strong understanding of the 
business or the circumstances of the regulated party. At the same time, there are signs that this 
lack of acknowledgement translates into a lack of understanding on the ground. For example, in its 
most recently available survey, only 38 per cent of people agreed that ASIC staff understood the 
industries and markets it regulates.67 
Complaints handling 
It is unclear whether the outlined complaints handling processes are actually effective in practice, 
particularly when it comes to identifying systemic issues across complaints data and addressing 
them. 
BCA members contacted as part of the preparation of this paper also expressed a reluctance to 
speak out publicly on specific complaints that they have of regulators. Businesses are concerned 
that doing so may have an adverse impact on their relationship with the regulator or the way in 
which current or future regulatory decisions are approached.  
It is concerning that this situation, even if it is only a matter of perception, does not appear to have 
improved in the last 10 years. The Review of Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and 
Office Holders (the Uhrig review) found: 
... a reluctance of individuals or businesses in the regulated community to voice complaints with a 
regulator about the way in which it uses its discretionary powers, because of the perceived possibility 
for an adverse future reaction.68 
Unlike more formal complaints bodies such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the regulators do 
not make complaints data transparent so that performance over time can be measured and there 
can be confidence that problem areas are being dealt with appropriately. 
 
67. Susan Bell Research, ASIC Stakeholder Survey 2013, September 2013, p. 66. 
68. Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders, 2003, 
p. 51. 
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Even the ATO, which receives the greatest volume of complaints, could do much more to utilise 
complaints data to improve its approach to clients. As the former Commonwealth Ombudsman 
suggested at the 2011 Tax Forum, the ATO needs: 
... a much better complaints handling system that treats complaints as the river of gold that it is. An 
organisation that takes complaints seriously, learns from them, does root cause analysis is going to 
slash its own costs, increase its own staff sense of wellbeing and actually relieve taxpayers of a vast 
burden as well.69 
Issues concerning the effectiveness of complaints handling also raise the question of whether 
regulators will ever be in a strong position to properly handle complaints. As the Uhrig review 
noted: 
The nature of the relationship between regulators and the regulated, including the potential use of 
punitive powers, may make it less likely that concerns with the administration of legislation will be 
highlighted through regular interactions.70  
This is another area that may be suited to being dealt with by an Inspector-General of Regulation. 
This could provide an independent mechanism for regulated parties to voice their complaints about 
a regulator. This is analysed further at the end of this part. 
Reforms to complaints mechanisms would assist in implementing commitments of the COAG 
National Regulatory and Competition Reform compact signed late last year, which suggests that 
governments will provide ‘effective mechanisms for business to provide feedback on regulators’ 
performance.’71 
Client relations 
Provided that groups and forums to foster client relations are convened by officers in the regulator 
with sufficient seniority to act on issues and concerns raised, then these mechanisms are valuable. 
The BCA also considers that the idea of having central points of contact in regulators so that large 
businesses have one rather than many points of entry into a regulator has merit – as far as the 
BCA is aware the ATO, ACCC and APRA all apply this model to varying degrees. However, the 
success of this position will depend on the seniority of the contact and their mandate within the 
organisation to require other parts of the organisation to respond to a regulated party’s concerns.  
 
Regulator Standard 8: Regulatory decisions are fair and contestable 
 
Needs 
improvement 
Summary of current arrangements 
While there are formal appeal mechanisms in place to ensure that regulatory decisions are fair and 
contestable, these mechanisms are inevitably time-consuming and resource intensive. The focus 
should be on reducing legislative complexity and ensuring that regulators live up to claims to be 
model litigators so as to prevent the need for regulated parties to resort to formal appeal 
mechanisms in the first place. 
 
69. A. Asher, then Commonwealth Ombudsman, ‘Session 6: Tax System Governance’ at the 2011 Tax Forum, 4–5 October 
2011. 
70. Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders, 2003, 
p. 68. 
71. COAG, National Compact on Regulatory and Competition Reform: Productivity Enhancing Reforms for a More 
Competitive Australia, 2012, p. 3. 
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Existing mechanisms 
In line with the BCA’s standards, regulatory decisions are fair and contestable to the extent that 
they are subject to fair and efficient appeal mechanisms that are proportionate to the impact of the 
decision.  
Regulators in Australia are generally answerable to courts and tribunals as part of the 
administrative law regime. A challenge to a regulator’s decisions in the courts through judicial or 
administrative law review can only be on the basis that the decision was beyond the power of the 
regulator or there was a lack of procedural fairness. 
There are also independent tribunals such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, where a party 
can seek a merits review of a regulatory decision, provided the legislation under which the 
regulator’s decision is made provides this right of review. A wide range of decisions made by ASIC, 
APRA and the ATO are subject to this review. Many decisions made by the ACCC are subject to 
the Australian Competition Tribunal, but there are some exceptions to this such as mergers. 
 
Shortcomings of current mechanisms 
The independence and thoroughness of these review and appeal processes can come at a major 
cost to efficiency – decisions are significantly delayed and there are substantial legal costs.  
For example, in 2011–12 the ATO’s legal costs were $96.4 million.72 While this may seem 
reasonable in the context of the ATO’s large budget and significant revenues it collects each year, 
it should be noted that these costs are of a similar magnitude to the global legal budget of many 
large multinational companies. Despite this, the ATO and many other regulators are keen to 
suggest that they are striving to be ‘model litigators’. 
Resort to formal mechanisms can be driven by legislative complexity 
Of course, resources are often tied up in courts and appeals processes due to legislative 
complexity or uncertainty, which is instigated early in the regulatory design process, long before 
regulators become involved. As the former Tax Commissioner Michael D’Ascenzo suggested at the 
2011 tax forum ‘As an administrator, you often have to work with the law you have.’73 The ATO is 
also keen to point out that its recent High Court record in which it has lost 10 out of 17 cases since 
 
72. Australian Taxation Office, Your Case Matters 2012 – Tax and Superannuation Litigation Trends, Ed. 2, 2012, p. 28. 
73. Australian Government, 2011 Tax Forum – ‘Session 6: Tax system Governance’, 5 October 2011, for transcripts of 
proceedings see <http://www.futuretax.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=TaxForum/Transcripts.htm>, viewed 
15 November 2013. 
Exhibit 5: Review of ACCC merger decisions 
One example of a lack of contestability in decision-making is the ACCC’s informal merger 
review process.  Decisions by the ACCC to oppose a merger or impose conditions are rarely 
challenged in the courts and, by virtue of their informal nature, they are not capable of review 
by the Australian Competition Tribunal (to date, the formal merger filing mechanism has not 
been used). This has resulted in a thin body of precedent, as well as a process that arguably 
continues to lack a sufficient degree of transparency, certainty and accountability, particularly 
in cases giving rise to complex competition issues where, arguably, greater probity is needed. 
In theory, the merging parties can apply to the Federal Court for a decision on the 
applicability of section 50. However, given the critical need for a quick decision in mergers 
versus the lengthy duration of legal proceedings, practically, litigation is not a realistic option 
in all but the most exceptional cases. The lack of any practically accessible review option 
over the ACCC’s merger decision-making is at odds with the treatment of other provisions of 
the CCA, particularly given the potentially significant and long-term economic consequences, 
both positive and negative, that can flow from merger activity. 
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July 2008 has been affected by eight test cases funded by the ATO to resolve contentious issues 
and areas of uncertainty in law interpretation.74 
The idea that clumsy regulation making is driving complex legislation that is difficult to resolve 
through the courts and other appeal mechanisms has also been cited by some judges. For 
example, Chief Justice Keane of the Federal Court made the following comments last year 
regarding the increasing volume and complexity of federal laws: 
... Opening the Tax Act is like entering the door to a parallel universe 
... It’s really hard. At the end of the day, our job is to make the best we can out of what emerges from 
the sausage machine. 
... Often, you could almost be forgiven for thinking that when legislation is being drafted, people come 
to a difficulty, and think, ‘We could actually resolve that, but that would require a level of disputation that 
we don’t want to have among ourselves at this stage, so we will leave it for the judges to work out’.75 
In reducing the complexity of legislation at the design stage, the Commonwealth Government has 
recently introduced the Clearer Commonwealth Laws Initiative, which is designed to provide 
mechanisms for the Office of Parliamentary Counsel and instructing agencies to identify and 
reduce complexity in legislation. This includes a ‘Complexity Flag System’ to raise, document and 
address issues around legislative complexity in a more structured way during the drafting phase. 
This system does not extend to existing legislation, and the benefits of this system will take some 
time to materialise. 
Another area of legislative complexity and uncertainty has been continuous disclosure. It resulted 
in a costly and time-consuming set of appeals processes in the well-publicised case between ASIC 
and Fortescue regarding claims of misleading and deceptive conduct brought by ASIC, which was 
ultimately resolved in the High Court. Figure 4 sets out the timeline of the matter over more than six 
years, from the time proceedings were first initiated until the full process of appeals ran its course. 
Figure 4: Timeline of the Fortescue Decision 
 
Source: Ashurst Company Law and Governance Update, ‘High Court upholds Fortescue Appeal: Fortescue 
and Mr Forrest successful’, 11 October 2012. 
The need for prevention 
Some regulators are taking steps both formally and informally to reduce the need for parties to 
resort to courts and other appeal mechanisms in resolving disputes. For example, the ATO seeks 
to apply alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and has an ATO Code of Settlement Practice, 
 
74. Australian Taxation Office, Your Case Matters 2012 – Tax and Superannuation Litigation Trends, Ed. 2, 2012, p. 20. 
75. J. Eyers, ‘Top Judge Hits out at Federal Laws’, The Australian Financial Review, 21 January 2011. 
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The Federal Court (Gilmour J) 
at f irst instance dismissed 
ASIC’s claim.
February 2011
The Full Federal Court 
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Fortescue and Mr Forrest
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which provides a principled basis upon which to negotiate liability. There are also instances where 
cases are resolved through mediation before reaching court. 
This highlights that the most effective mechanism in boosting the efficiency and effectiveness of 
appeals processes is through reducing the number of cases where regulated parties must resort to 
them. This could involve: 
• An extension of the Office of Parliamentary Counsel’s ‘Complexity Flag System’ to cover existing 
legislation. This would allow regulated parties, courts and regulators to identify existing areas of 
legislation that are complex and uncertain and driving unnecessary resort to formal mechanisms. 
Policymakers could then prioritise areas for reform and devise both interim and long-term 
solutions to address issues of existing legislative complexity and uncertainty. 
• An independent body auditing major regulators to ensure that they are living up to their 
commitments to be ‘model litigators’ and instituting legal action and appeals only where it is 
absolutely necessary. This could be undertaken by an Inspector-General of Regulation as 
outlined below. 
A new performance and accountability framework for regulators 
In light of the issues raised in this paper, it is clear that the existing machinery of government could 
be improved to strengthen regulator accountability, promote a more balanced approach to 
measuring their performance, and investigate systemic issues with their performance. 
The BCA would like to see the performance and accountability framework for regulators 
fundamentally strengthened to more closely align with best practice.  
As the Banks taskforce suggested “... the actions and attitudes of regulators, like those of business, 
are shaped by the incentives they face as well as by the requirements placed on them.”76 
Therefore, the best way to drive greater accountability is to have major regulators operating within 
a new legislative framework that provides incentives to balance rigorous enforcement with 
efficiency and facilitating economic progress. This requires: 
• A balanced performance framework that focuses not just on transactional enforcement and 
compliance activities by regulators, but also on the objective of facilitating economic progress, 
by balancing risk with the costs imposed. 
• Greater oversight of regulators so that regulators have appropriate independence from 
government, but are not above scrutiny or accountability to portfolio ministers and a dedicated 
independent body. 
• Regulators clearly documenting and consistently implementing a risk-based approach to 
enforcement and compliance activities. 
• Appropriate checks and balances on the regulation-making and policy powers of regulators to 
manage the risk that regulators, in effect, become policymakers and bestow increased powers 
upon themselves. 
• A general requirement that regulators establish public targets on streamlining their processes and 
associated regulatory burden each year. This could be measured in terms of an annual reduction 
in average time spent by each regulated party on administrative compliance activities and 
administrative delays experienced. 
• A requirement that client service charters more strongly focus on the need for regulators to 
understand the business of regulated parties better and outline their standards and approach for 
most effectively engaging and interacting with regulated parties. 
 
76. Regulation Taskforce, Rethinking Regulation: Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, 
January 2006, p. 159. 
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Inspector-General of Regulation 
Independent oversight will be critical in facilitating and measuring adherence to a new legislative 
performance and accountability framework for regulators. This role could be undertaken by an 
Inspector-General of Regulation.  
This is not a new idea. The ATO already has an Inspector-General of Taxation, whose mandate is 
to identify systemic issues with the administration of the tax law.77 This is one of the few 
accountability mechanisms that examines the overall regulatory approach of a regulator and the 
Inspector-General can initiate their own review based on complaints that they receive. 
In addition, almost a decade ago the Uhrig review recommended that the Commonwealth establish 
an Inspector-General of Regulation with a view to providing the community with a mechanism to 
ensure that regulators are being held to account for the way in which they exercise their powers. It 
was the opinion of the Uhrig review that business would be more likely to feel comfortable making 
complaints about regulators to such an independent body. 
This recommendation was not taken up by the government at the time, and while official 
explanations for rejecting this recommendation reveal little, there have been some suggestions that 
the recommendation was rejected following considerable opposition from some regulators.78 
Clearly, the creation of a new body would need to avoid the pitfalls of duplication and the creation 
of another layer of bureaucracy that fails to deliver improvements to government regulation.  
Investing resources in such a body is justified on the basis of the considerable expenditure on 
regulatory functions identified earlier and the considerable cost of poorly designed and 
administered regulation on the community. 
Eliminating just a fraction of this cost each year may derive a net benefit. In addition, the creation of 
an Inspector-General may ultimately reduce expenditure on regulatory bodies by helping them to 
operate more efficiently. The introduction of such a body could also be accompanied by 
streamlining existing weak and ineffective accountability mechanisms currently in place. 
In doing this, there could be an opportunity to create an independent umpire that has oversight of 
the full regulatory system – right from regulatory impact analysis through to the implementation of 
regulation. This could involve subsuming the functions of the Office of Best Practice Regulation, 
Ombudsman handling of regulator-related complaints, and some Auditor-General functions in 
relation to regulators. This would be a fundamental change from the current model and a range of 
considerations would impact the net benefit of adopting such a model. 
Nonetheless, such an operational model would make an Inspector-General uniquely positioned to 
identify and address the root causes of unnecessary regulatory burden across the regulatory cycle, 
potentially resulting in more meaningful, substantive improvements in performance.  
Alternatively, an operational model focused solely on regulators could be adopted. 
An Inspector-General could undertake a number of roles in relation to regulators, including: 
• Establishing a risk-based performance audit process, where those regulators with the most 
significant impact on the community and those with a poor track record being subject to more 
frequent audits. 
• Developing best practice guidance, tools and templates for regulators including in relation to 
implementing more balanced performance frameworks, client service charters, risk-based 
compliance and enforcement approaches. 
• Reporting on the progress of regulators in streamlining their approaches and reducing regulatory 
burden. 
 
77. Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003, Section 3. 
78. S. Bartos, ‘The Uhrig Report: Damp Squib or Ticking Timebomb?’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 
March 2005, pp. 95–99. 
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• Identifying systemic cases of legislative complexity that are unnecessarily leading to time-
consuming and expensive judicial processes. 
There are trade-offs between increased accountability and independence, and no doubt regulators 
would argue that an Inspector-General would compromise independence to some extent. However, 
the Commonwealth already has a working model in the Inspector-General of Taxation, which has 
not undermined the independence of the ATO. 
 
Undertake a number of procedural quick wins 
There are a number of opportunities for the government to extend current processes and 
procedures to ensure that regulators’ efforts are well targeted.  
Firstly, while there is no evidence of systemic failures in the separation of policymaking from 
regulators, there is room for more clearly defining the role of regulators in this area, particularly as 
technical regulation and guidance is increasingly issued by regulators. 
Secondly, there is a need to ensure that there are transparent and effective mechanisms for 
regulated parties, courts and regulators to report areas of regulation that are complex and 
uncertain leading to expensive and potentially unnecessary resort to formal dispute mechanisms. 
These costs occur at the back-end of the regulatory process due to poor design at the front-end or 
regulation failing to keep pace with economic developments. 
A number of procedural quick wins are outlined below that should be pursued as a matter of priority 
and implemented within the next 12 months. 
 
Recommendation 3: The Auditor-General, in updating the Australian National Audit Office’s 
Guide to Administering Regulation, should include guidance on the appropriate role of 
regulators in relation to policymaking. It should also outline how regulation making by 
regulators should be undertaken and monitored to ensure that it does not encroach on 
policymaking that is rightfully the role of the executive arm of government. 
Priority Action 2: Implement a new performance and accountability code for all major 
regulators in omnibus legislation. Such legislation should include provision for: 
• The establishment of an Inspector-General of Regulation to provide additional oversight of 
regulators, including undertaking biennial performance audits of major regulators and 
responding to systemic issues identified by regulated parties. Such a body could be 
established within the Productivity Commission with a clear mandate to take active steps to 
improve regulator performance and recommend the streamlining of regulation where it is 
impeding the efficiency of regulators and placing unnecessary costs on regulated parties. 
• A balanced performance reporting framework should assess not only enforcement and 
compliance activities but the extent to which these are undertaken efficiently. 
• Regulators to prepare annual ‘Statements of Accountability’ that outline the basis for 
measuring the success of the regulator in agreement with the portfolio minister and the 
Inspector-General of Regulation. 
• Regulators to establish public targets on streamlining their processes to reduce regulatory 
burden each year. 
• Regulators to document, regularly update and adhere to a risk-based approach to 
compliance and enforcement activities. 
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Recommendation 5: The Commonwealth Government should extend the Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel’s ‘Complexity Flag System’ to cover existing legislation in addition to 
legislation being drafted. This would allow regulated parties, courts and regulators to report 
existing areas of legislation that are complex and uncertain and that are driving unnecessary 
resort to courts and formal mechanisms. Interim and longer-term actions to resolve these 
complexities could then be devised. 
Recommendation 4: The Office of Parliamentary Counsel, in collaboration with the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, should issue guidance to policymakers and 
legislative drafters regarding the appropriate constraints that should be placed on the 
regulation-making role of regulators when drafting such roles into legislation. 
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PART 3: REDUCING THE STOCK OF POOR REGULATION 
This final part of the paper addresses where governments should focus their efforts in beginning to 
remove and in some cases modernise the existing stock of regulation. This includes: 
• Embedding systematic processes to address the stock of regulation. 
• Streamlining critical areas of regulatory burden. 
Where does regulation go wrong? 
The Banks Regulation Taskforce identified five features that contribute to excessive compliance 
burdens and inefficient regulation: 
1. Excessive coverage, including ‘regulatory creep’: These are regulations that over time 
capture more businesses or activities than was originally intended. 
2. Overlapping and inconsistent regulatory requirements: These can arise within one 
government but the most pervasive form in Australia tends to occur across jurisdictions, 
affecting national companies. 
3. Regulation that is redundant or not justified: These regulations were either poorly designed 
from the start but have endured, or became ineffective over time and were not reviewed. 
4. Excessive reporting or recording burden: Multiple demands for similar information from 
different arms of government without coordination can create significant burdens for business. 
5. Variations in definition and reporting requirements: These differences create confusion 
and require considerable effort for business in understanding how to comply with its 
obligations. 
The BCA considers that these five features are more likely to be found in regulations that have 
been designed through processes that depart from the BCA’s Standards for Rule Making. By this, 
we are not simply referring to processes that comprehensively fail to meet the 30 standards, but 
even processes that fail on one or two of the standards.  
We believe that there is very little margin for error when it comes to designing efficient regulation, 
underlining the importance of dedicated adherence to good process and rigorous policymaking 
practices at all times and at all stages of regulatory development. 
Exhibits 6 to 8 demonstrate recent examples of poor practice against the BCA’s standards. 
 
Exhibit 6: BCA Standards for Rule Making in Practice: Government vs business 
regulatory treatment 
Standard 2.5 – Government and business regulatory treatment is neutral (where applicable) 
• In the first half of 2012, parliament passed the Equal Opportunity for Women in the 
Workplace Amendment Bill 2012, which made all businesses employing 100 or more 
people subject to requirements to report on a range of gender equity indicators. 
• It is notable that the compliance burden of these changes were seen as too burdensome 
for the public sector but appropriate for the private sector. The Regulation Impact 
Statement to the Bill suggests [emphasis added]: 
... the size of the public sector workforce may itself be a compelling reason to defer its 
inclusion in the regime. Significant extra resources would be required to monitor and work 
with these organisations, as well as a specific skill set which has not been developed in EOWA 
to date. 
Source: Australian Government, Reform of the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 
1999 – Regulation Impact Statement, 2012, p. 65. 
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Exhibit 7: BCA Standards for Rule Making in Practice: New South Wales Fuel Price 
Board Regulation 
In June 2012, in response to concerns that motorists could be misled by petrol stations 
displaying only the discounted price of fuel with shop-a-docket discounts, the New South Wales 
Fair Trading Minister proposed new regulation of fuel price boards. The regulation had a 
number of critical flaws, with major departures from good regulation making outlined below. 
Standard 1.3: All options that are proportionate to the problem at hand are considered, 
including non-regulatory options. 
• The proposed regulation not only banned the display of discounted petrol prices, but required 
the display of all fuel products available at petrol stations. Common practice is for fuel 
retailers to display only a few of their most popular fuels. The regulation therefore required a 
substantial increase in the size of fuel price boards – a requirement largely unrelated to the 
perceived problem. 
Standard 2.1: Cost–benefit analysis, that includes a detailed understanding of the costs to 
business is the centrepiece of regulatory impact assessment processes 
• Industry estimates that the regulation will cost NSW fuel retailers $70 million, but the 25-page 
Regulation Impact Statement contains no quantification of costs or benefits. 
Standard 2.9: Regulatory impact assessments are subject to adequate public consultation 
• The proposed regulations were released on 28 June 2012, with less than a month for 
submissions (due 25 July) for a start date of 1 September 2012. 
Standard 3.3: Before drafting new regulation, governments test whether an existing regulation 
or other Australian governments already address the same or related problem 
• The regulatory proposal comes at the same time that the Ministerial Council on Consumer 
Affairs has agreed to consider the development of a national approach to fuel price board 
regulation. 
• The Commonwealth Government has also undertaken substantial work on this issue that was 
neglected in the rush to regulate. In the 460-page report of the ACCC, Monitoring of the 
Australian Petroleum Industry, December 2011, there is an extensive discussion of retail 
competition but no discussion of any problem with inadequate fuel price boards. 
Disappointingly, Consumer Affairs Ministers have released a public consultation paper 
canvassing a possible national model along similar lines to New South Wales, on the basis of 
around 70 complaints received by the ACCC each year on this issue. 
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Systematic processes to address the stock of regulation 
Evening out the current bias towards new regulation 
Currently, incentives in the regulatory system are largely in favour of introducing new regulation 
rather than removing ineffective or overly burdensome regulation. In order to provide an incentive 
and regularly prompt government to reassess ineffective or overly burdensome regulation, 
agencies and ministers should be required to make every attempt to identify an offsetting reduction 
in existing red tape each time new regulation is introduced.  
These sorts of mechanisms have been assessed by some regulatory experts as being a relatively 
crude mechanism for managing the regulatory stock. Notwithstanding these assessments, we 
believe that such a mechanism needs to be implemented as a stop-gap measure, with the case for 
its ongoing use re-evaluated after five years. It may take some time for governments to establish 
both a meaningful and workable offsetting regime. Therefore, less sophisticated interim measures 
such as ‘one in, one out’ within the same portfolio may have to be employed to even out the bias 
towards increasing the stock of regulation. 
 
Implement existing findings on the stock of regulation 
Given the strong body of existing work from the Productivity Commission that has reviewed key 
areas of the regulatory stock, every effort should be made to utilise these reports. While in many 
cases the government has published responses to these reviews, in most cases such responses 
lack implementation plans and it would appear that many recommendations have not been 
implemented at this stage. 
Priority Action 3: Require all new regulations that will result in a significant increase in 
regulatory burden to have an equivalent offsetting red tape reduction in the same portfolio.  
Exhibit 8: BCA Standards for Rule Making in practice: Public consultation 
Standard 2.9 – Regulatory impact assessments are subject to adequate public consultation 
• The BCA’s standards recommend a consultation period of at least two months. Recent 
experience has suggested a common tendency to release complex regulation for just one 
month over the Christmas holiday period: 
− On 20 December 2010, the then Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer released an 
exposure draft of the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and 
Executive Remuneration) Bill 2011 and associated explanatory material. The draft Bill 
contained measures relating to the regulatory framework surrounding the remuneration of 
company directors and executives. Closing date for submissions: 20 January 2011. 
− On 12 December 2010, the then Deputy Prime Minister announced the Competitive and 
Sustainable Banking System Package. The exposure draft legislation, as set out in the 
Competition and Consumer (Price Signalling) Amendment Bill 2011, proposed amendments 
to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 to address anti-competitive price signalling and 
information exchanges. Closing date for submissions: 14 January 2011. 
− On 28 February 2013, the then Assistant Treasurer released a consultation paper on the 
government’s proposed changes from quarterly to monthly company tax instalments. These 
changes have a significant compliance cost impact on businesses and also have an 
adverse impact on cashflow. Closing date for submissions: 13 March 2013. 
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The BCA would like to see these reviews taken seriously and their recommendations implemented 
thoroughly with reform progress monitored, unless there are particularly strong public interest 
grounds for not implementing a recommendation. 
Table 3: Recent Productivity Commission reviews of regulatory burden 
Annual Reviews of Regulatory Burdens Performance Benchmarking of Australian 
Business Regulation 
2007 – Primary sector 2008 – Quantity and Quality  
2008 – Manufacturing sector and distributive trades  2008 – Cost of Business Registration  
2009 – Social and economic infrastructure services  2009 – Occupational Health and Safety  
2010 – Business and consumer services  2009 – Food Safety 
2011 – Identifying and Evaluating Regulation 
Reforms  
2010 – Planning, Zoning and Development 
Assessment  
 2011 – Role of Local Government as Regulator  
2012 – Regulatory Impact Analysis: Benchmarking  
2013 – Regulator engagement with small business 
(current) 
Source: Productivity Commission website, 2013. 
 
Assess and address cumulative regulatory burdens 
Many agencies introduce regulation without a full understanding of the cumulative burden of 
regulation on the sector or part of the economy that they are regulating. As a result, there is often a 
narrow focus on the marginal effect of new rules without proper appreciation of duplication, overlap 
and the full costs of regulation that are being imposed on a sector. 
In future, the Productivity Commission’s annual benchmarking and regulatory burden review 
programs could be consolidated and structured to provide rolling audits of the cumulative 
regulatory burden in each industry sector at least every five years. 
 
Sunsetting and statutory reviews 
Regulation is rarely perfect at a point in time particularly given rapid changes in markets and 
technology. Therefore, there must be regular systematic opportunities to refresh regulation, 
including going back to first principles and making the case again for continuing regulation. 
The prospect of regular review provides a strong incentive for regulation-makers to be more diligent 
and thorough in designing high-quality regulation at the start of the regulatory cycle. 
The Legislative Instruments Act currently provides for the automatic sunsetting of a range of 
delegated legislative instruments every 10 years. Analysis conducted by the Office of Best Practice 
Recommendation 7: Reinvigorate the Productivity Commission’s annual benchmarking and 
regulatory burden review programs by establishing rolling audits of the cumulative regulatory 
burden in each industry sector at least every five years.  
Recommendation 6: Australian Governments should seek to implement all of the 155 
recommendations from the Productivity Commission’s annual reviews of regulatory burden 
that were undertaken from 2007 to 2011. 
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Regulation has also identified that legislation and regulation introduced since 2007 has generally 
been subject to statutory review provisions. 
These sorts of review mechanisms not only provide a prompt for regular refreshing of the 
regulatory stock but also a strong incentive to get regulatory design right in the first instance and to 
put in place arrangements for monitoring the effectiveness of the regulation to justify its future 
remaking. 
The Borthwick–Milliner review and Productivity Commission have recommended introducing a 
sunset clause or a review provision into all primary legislation that has a significant impact on 
business. While some Commonwealth regulation is subject to sunsetting requirements and 
statutory review, there are a range of instruments that are not subject to these requirements. 
In its response, the previous government chose not to accept the recommendation for a sunsetting 
requirement, preferring for review mechanisms to be incorporated into new legislation as 
necessary. In effect, any requirements to regularly review regulation continue to be at the discretion 
of the responsible minister. 
It is problematic to extend automatic sunset provisions to apply to all primary legislation due to 
uncertainty and because of the considerable parliamentary and legislative drafting workload that 
would be involved. However, this has not stopped jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom in 
implementing robust and well-targeted sunsetting mechanisms for primary legislation. For this 
reason, we believe that sunsetting arrangements should be extended to primary legislation that has 
a significant impact where it is practicable to do so.  
Similarly, requiring statutory reviews would serve to reinforce and institutionalise current practice 
rather than creating additional burdens. 
The BCA’s proposed approach recognises that the greatest priority for detailed re-examination of 
the need for regulation from first principles should be targeted to legislation and legislative 
instruments that have the greatest impact with appropriate exceptions from these requirements. 
These proposed arrangements are outlined further in Exhibit 9. 
 
Recommendation 8: Regularly refresh and streamline the regulatory stock by better 
targeting existing review and sunsetting requirements. 
• Extend sunsetting requirements to primary legislation where it has a significant impact and 
it is practicable to subject it to a full remaking every 10 years. 
• All primary legislation and legislative instruments that have highly significant or uncertain 
impacts on business and the community should be subject to statutory review every five 
years.  
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Streamlining critical areas of regulatory burden 
In identifying areas of priority for regulatory reform, the BCA does not consider it is sufficient to 
simply provide a long list of detailed regulatory annoyances. An efficient regulatory system focused 
on continual improvement and frequent dialogue with regulated parties should address these 
issues as a matter of course. Nonetheless, this part of the paper does identify various examples of 
highly illogical regulatory provisions that are present under the areas of strategic importance 
outlined here. 
The BCA has placed greater focus on identifying broad areas of regulation often spanning multiple 
regulatory instruments and jurisdictions that are systemically inefficient, in line with the five criteria 
outlined above. We have also chosen areas of regulation that are strategically important – that is, 
areas of regulation critical to future economic growth and meeting looming challenges. 
On this basis, the BCA has identified five areas of inefficient regulation that it considers are in need 
of reform: 
1. Planning and zoning regulation 
2. Retail sector regulation 
3. Environmental assessment and approvals 
4. Workplace regulations 
5. Corporate governance regulation 
 
 
 
Exhibit 9: Scope and coverage of proposed sunsetting and statutory review 
arrangements 
• All primary legislation and legislative instruments such as regulation that has highly 
significant or uncertain impacts to be subject to statutory review every five years.  
• Legislative instruments to be subject to automatic sunset at least every 10 years and 
primary legislation where it has a significant impact and it is practicable to subject it to a full 
remaking every 10 years.  
− This recognises that an automatic lapse could be problematic for some primary legislation 
and if applied too widely would result in considerable additional parliamentary and 
legislative drafting workload. It would instead be applied to all new legislation on a  
case- by-case basis where it is practical and there is a net benefit. 
• Instruments that have been introduced on a temporary basis or in industries subject to 
frequent change (particularly due to technological developments) should be subject to 
shorter sunset requirements of at least every five years (where practicable). 
• Existing instruments that are judged to have a significant impact are subjected to a 
Regulation Impact Statement before being remade. 
• Exceptions from these requirements to apply for both legislation and legislative instruments 
such as those:  
− that are critical to the ongoing functioning of government, such as the budget 
− relating to matters of national security or emergency response 
− upon which consistent and certain application is absolutely critical to upholding justice, 
business continuity, democratic institutions, community safety and security. 
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Table 4 outlines how each of these areas aligns with the criteria for inefficient regulation. 
Table 4: Priority areas for regulatory reform 
Area Excessive 
coverage 
Generates 
unnecessary 
delays 
Excessive 
reporting or 
recording 
Variation in 
definitions and 
reporting 
requirements 
Inconsistent 
and 
overlapping 
requirements 
Planning 
and zoning      
Retail sector 
     
Environmental 
assessment and 
approvals 
     
Workplace 
regulations      
Corporate 
governance 
regulation 
     
These regulations involve areas of Commonwealth Government responsibility as well as areas that 
have traditionally been dealt with through Commonwealth–state collaboration. The impetus for 
reform and plan for progressing the reform agenda is outlined below. 
Actions to progress state-based reforms 
Planning and zoning, retail sector and environmental assessment and approvals are all areas that 
have previously been taken up on COAG’s agenda for reform. 
This presents challenges at a time when some are questioning the strength of Australia’s 
federation. The outgoing Chairman of the COAG Reform Council recently suggested that the 2008 
reforms to COAG, which were directed at a new form of federalism that placed fewer prescriptions 
on states, were effectively unravelling.79  
Implementing ambitious regulatory reforms such as these through a degree of both collaboration 
and healthy regulatory competition requires a circuit-breaker that moves beyond the traditional 
models of COAG regulatory reform. 
This could be achieved through a productivity payments scheme designed to encourage more 
timely and expansive regulatory reform in areas of significance to the national economy such as 
planning, retail sector regulation and environmental assessment and approvals.  
It would be a bottom-up reform process with states submitting their best proposals for deregulating 
and lifting productivity in these and other areas through a competitive bid process. The possible 
benefits of reform proposals would be assessed by the Productivity Commission to inform choices 
around bid funding. The Productivity Commission could also assess state eligibility for payments 
should the reforms achieve their objectives. 
The experience of National Competition Policy demonstrated that reward payments work in driving 
major microeconomic reform by the states and territories.  
With the Commonwealth continuing to collect around 83 per cent80 of taxes in the federation, it 
stands to gain greater fiscal benefits from the economic gains from state reform and it is therefore 
 
79. P. McClintock, ‘Harnessing Federalism – The Missing Key to Successful Reform’, Public Lecture presented by the 
Sir Roland Wilson Foundation and Crawford School of Public Policy, Canberra, 19 November 2012. 
80. BCA calculation based on ABS, Taxation Revenue 2010–11, cat. no. 5506. 
Business Council of Australia  70 
appropriate that some of these gains are distributed to the states for their efforts through 
productivity payments. 
In a tight fiscal environment for states, the increase in direct funding linked to deregulation could be 
a powerful incentive. Further detail on how such a scheme could work is provided in Exhibit 10. 
 
 
Recommendation 9: In introducing productivity payments to the states in order to encourage 
regulatory improvement, the Commonwealth Government should target the first round of 
competitive funding bids on state reforms to planning and zoning, environmental assessment 
and approval, and retail sector regulation. 
Priority Action 4: Introduce productivity payments from the Commonwealth to the states in 
order to encourage regulatory improvement and efficiency. Payments should target state-led 
regulatory reform in areas of significance to the national economy and involving multiple 
levels of government regulators. 
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Exhibit 10: National Productivity Payments 
Purpose of productivity payments 
The purpose of Productivity Payments is to encourage bottom-up state government 
competition and regulatory reforms that have a national benefit.  
Why are productivity payments needed? 
State governments require incentives to initiate and undertake difficult microeconomic 
reforms that have a national benefit. This is because proportionately fewer of the fiscal 
benefits of productivity-enhancing reforms accrue to state governments. This is due to 
national taxation arrangements which see less than 50 per cent of state government revenue 
collected through state government taxes; the remaining revenue is comprised of 
Commonwealth grants, the GST and charges.  
The current approach to incentivising states to undertake microeconomic reforms that have a 
national benefit is via National Partnership Agreements. This approach has not delivered the 
desired results. For example, the Seamless National Economy Reforms have not delivered 
all the productivity-enhancing outcomes that were intended.  
A new approach is need for two reasons. Firstly, the approach taken under the Seamless 
National Economy, which was characterised by close Commonwealth oversight of milestones 
that were often not related to reform outcomes, is ill suited to incentivising state government 
reform.  
The Commonwealth adopted a ‘micromanagement’ approach to incentivising states to deliver 
reforms. This approach focused on administrative outcomes – such as producing reports or 
Regulation Impact Statements – rather than reform outcomes. Consequently, states were 
able to achieve most milestones without necessarily delivering reform benefits on the ground. 
There were also national partnerships to deliver Commonwealth-own initiatives, which did not 
necessarily have the buy-in of state governments.   
Secondly, many of the big gains from microeconomic reform do not need a national 
approach. National partnerships are inherently a joint reform agreement between the 
Commonwealth and states, and this form is ill suited to incentivising state-only reform. 
A new system of Productivity Payments would incentivise state governments to undertake 
microeconomic reforms that have a national benefit by: 
• delivering autonomy to state governments in implementing the reforms but only paying 
upon the achievement of outcomes 
• ensuring state governments received increased fiscal benefits from reform. 
Business Council of Australia  72 
 
 
Exhibit 10: National Productivity Payments (continued) 
What reforms should be eligible? 
Competition and regulatory reforms would be eligible to be included in a National Productivity 
Payments scheme. To be eligible reforms would need to meet certain criteria. The proposed 
reforms: 
• would need to have a demonstrable and measurable impact on national productivity – the 
scheme should not reward states for undertaking routine reforms 
• should be innovative and be able to be emulated by other jurisdictions – this will ensure 
that states that have already undertaken difficult reforms are not penalised for being first 
movers.  
Productivity payments should not be made with respect to infrastructure projects, privatisation 
of public assets, or reforms to government service delivery, all of which are dealt with in other 
schemes and processes.  
Productivity payments should not be used to incentivise a national scheme – harmonisation 
and national schemes should be pursued on a multilateral basis, for example through more 
selective use of national partnerships. 
While these criteria will define broad eligibility, further focus on particular reform areas will be 
required. For this reason, there should be three-year periods of focus on specific reform 
areas. For example, in the first three-year period, the Commonwealth should call for 
competition and regulatory reform proposals (consistent with the above criteria) relating to: 
• state government planning processes 
• access to natural resources (water, energy and minerals) 
• project costs and construction sector regulation (construction codes) 
• local government reform 
• retail sector deregulation. 
Governance and institutions 
The Productivity Commission should be responsible for, and given full authority and 
independence to carry out the following functions: 
• assessing eligibility for proposed reforms 
• defining the outcomes/achievements that must be met to obtain payment 
• ranking the reforms by their potential to lift productivity  
• determining if reform objectives have been achieved and the associated eligibility for 
payments 
• publishing its assessments and rankings. 
The Treasurer will ultimately be responsible for determining if a reform is included in the 
scheme and if a payment should be made.  
The National Productivity Payments Scheme could be established by way of 
intergovernmental agreement negotiated with state government heads of treasuries. 
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Planning and zoning regulation 
Rationale 
Taking full advantage of the incredible potential of our cities as they grow involves managing 
growth and mitigating the impacts of congestion. This means that our planning and zoning 
regulation will need to become considerably more agile to promote both economic growth and 
liveability. 
Australia’s cities will experience significant growth in the coming decades – Sydney and Melbourne 
are each projected to grow to approximately seven million people by 2050, and Brisbane to four 
million people.81 
In addition, Australia’s cities are integral to strong economic growth in the future. For example:  
• Major cities account for around 80 per cent of GDP growth and nearly 75 per cent of Australia’s 
workforce. Even during the resources boom, major cities’ share of the national economy has 
increased. 
• Our cities are also the prime drivers of productivity arising from the concentration of firms and the 
deeper pool of workers in cities which promotes the sharing of knowledge and expertise. 
Evidence 
The extensive shortcomings of Australia’s current system of planning and zoning regulation have 
been well acknowledged. For example, in its review of planning, zoning and development 
assessment, the Productivity Commission found that: 
The regulations and agencies involved in planning, zoning and development assessments constitute 
one of the most complex regulatory regimes operating in Australia. This regulatory system is not like 
most other regimes which have a clearer delineation between policymaking, regulation writing and 
administration.82 
 
81. ABS, Population Projections, Australia, 2006 to 2101, cat. no. 3222.0, 2012. 
82. Productivity Commission, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation: Planning, Zoning and 
Development Assessment, 2011, p. xxvi. 
Exhibit 10: National Productivity Payments (continued) 
Payments 
Payments should only be made once the reform outcomes (as originally determined by the 
Productivity Commission) have been achieved. In this regard there should be four options 
open to the Treasurer when making payments: 
• make a payment in full 
• make a partial payment where the reform has not achieved the full desired outcome 
• suspend a payment until an outcome is delivered 
• suspend all productivity payments to a jurisdiction where a key reform outcome has not 
been delivered, or previous reforms have been unwound or reversed. 
Funding 
It is important to note that payments need not flow immediately with the design of the scheme 
and reforms all taking time before outcomes are realised.  
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Planning regulation has a significant impact on the cost and ultimate attractiveness of investment – 
BCA members have advised that lenders apply different risk premiums when funding 
developments, based on the expected delays in different jurisdictions’ planning systems. The 
potential magnitude of the cost of delays has been well illustrated by the OECD: 
The time cost of delay for a company is not simply the interest rate it pays on borrowed funds while 
waiting for approval; it is the opportunity cost of its funds, which is higher than the interest rate. If the 
opportunity cost of money is 15 per cent per year, and planning adds three years to the time to 
opening a new site, as is possible with complex projects with appeals, the cost of delay is 52 
per cent of the initial investment.83 
In Victoria, which is considered to be one of the better performing states, the average planning 
scheme amendment takes around 50 weeks from receipt to finalisation. Complex amendments and 
those requiring environmental approvals generally exceed these timeframes.84 
Recent reform progress 
A number of states are progressing reforms to their planning systems, most notably New South 
Wales with its recently released A New Planning System for New South Wales – White Paper.  
In addition, through the Business Advisory Forum, COAG has previously agreed to progress 
reforms to encourage better development assessment processes for low-risk, low-impact 
development, although progress to date has been disappointing. 
Retail sector regulation 
Rationale 
The retail sector is one of Australia’s largest employers, accounting for over 11 per cent of 
Australia’s workforce.85 
It is confronting an increasingly challenging environment with the high Australian dollar, online 
competition and the reduced confidence of consumers. Given the considerable structural 
challenges before the retail sector, it is critical that there are not undue regulatory impediments to 
the sector responding and adapting flexibly to these challenges. 
Evidence 
In its 2011 inquiry into the retail sector, the Productivity Commission found that “Retailers operate 
under several regulatory regimes that restrict their competitiveness and ability to innovate.”86 
These regimes include planning and zoning, retail tenancy regulation, transport restrictions, retail 
trading hours, workplace relations and a range of inconsistent state-based regulation. Examples of 
these burdens are highlighted at Exhibit 11. 
Australian’s retail sector productivity does not compare well with other jurisdictions and this gap 
has widened over time. Deloitte Access Economics estimates that if the Australian retail sector had 
enjoyed the same productivity growth that the US has experienced over the last decade, then 
output in the sector would be 9.2 per cent higher, prices would be 3.5 per cent lower and there 
would be 180,000 more people employed.87 
 
83. OECD, ‘Land Use Restrictions as Barriers to Entry’, Policy Roundtables, 2008, p. 36. 
84. Municipal Association of Victoria, Submission to the Victorian Government’s review of the Planning and Environment 
Act 1987. 
85. ABS, Labour Force, Australia, Detailed, Quarterly, cat. no. 6291.0, May 2013. 
86. Productivity Commission, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, December 2011, 
p. xiv. 
87. Deloitte Access Economics, The Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, June 2011, p. 5. 
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Exhibit 11: Retail sector regulatory burdens 
Storage of dangerous goods 
• The licensing and notification limits for each class of dangerous goods are different in each 
jurisdiction.  
• For example, in Victoria if a company holds over 10,000 kg of aerosols then you need to 
notify the regulator but in some other jurisdictions such as South Australia you do not. 
• Each jurisdiction also has different requirements for how and when requirements are 
discharged (e.g. placarding, manifests, registers). 
Quarantine rules 
• Tasmania claims quarantine is required for fruit fly when in reality fruit fly does not occur 
over winter in Tasmania. 
• Only honey which is made in Western Australia can be sold in Western Australia. 
• Only fin fish which is caught in Tasmania can be sold in Tasmania. 
• Only Australian rice which is made in the Riverina district can be sold in the Riverina 
district. 
Transport restrictions 
• A number of councils apply curfews generally from 6pm to 7am that restrict night time 
deliveries for major retailers. They are designed to reduce light and noise disturbances for 
residents. 
• The impact of these restrictions is to increase transit time due to congestion on roads in 
peak hours, increase unload times due to congestion at stores, increase travelling 
distances, increase fleet requirement as deliveries are more concentrated through the day 
and increase congestion at distribution centres. 
Persistent Trade Measurement inconsistency 
• One company described the highly variable advice received from different states in regards 
to the interpretation of the word “meat” in the Uniform Trade Measurement Legislation. In 
one state meat was defined as red meat only while in another it was defined as all animal 
flesh other than seafood. 
Food labelling 
• A number of jurisdictions have introduced or are planning to introduce new regulatory 
regimes requiring major fast food outlets to display kilojoule information alongside the price 
of the product on their menu boards, website, leaflets and menus.  
• Supermarkets have also become caught in this regulatory regime – for items such as BBQ 
chickens, bread products and salads made in store. Implementing the laws will cost large 
and small supermarkets over $10 million in one state with new ticketing machinery, new 
display infrastructure and catalogue changes. 
Trading hours restrictions 
There are a range of outdated trading restrictions across states, including: 
• In Western Australia, hardware stores cannot open before 11am on Sundays if they stock 
both light bulbs and light fittings. This is because the Retail Trading Hours Regulation 1988 
prohibits the sale of light fittings before then. 
• In NSW, the Retail Trading Act 2008 makes Boxing Day shopping legal in 40 local 
government areas, but illegal in another 112.  
• In South Australia, the Shop Trading Hours Act 1977 prevents shops in Adelaide from 
opening before 11am on a Sunday. But an exemption is available that allows shops to open 
early if they sell “asbestos cement sheet and articles”. 
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Recent reform progress 
The Commonwealth Government’s response to the Productivity Commission’s inquiry into the retail 
sector did not seek to proactively progress the issues raised . It noted or agreed-in-principle to the 
12 recommendations and did not map out an implementation plan. It also took no responsibility for 
coordinating state and local government based regulatory issues raised by the inquiry. There is no 
evidence of any progress being made against the Productivity Commission’s recommendations at 
this stage. 
Environmental assessment and approvals 
Rationale 
While resources investment shows clear signs of easing, it is still expected to remain a critical part 
of our economy in the period ahead, representing 6 per cent of GDP in 2013–14.88 This only serves 
to reinforce the importance of ensuring that any unnecessary or overly burdensome regulatory 
requirements on investment are addressed. 
Regulatory impediments put at risk the cost effectiveness and competitiveness of Australia’s 
investment pipeline – there are almost $900 billion of committed and prospective investment 
opportunities in large-scale projects, mostly in resources and economic infrastructure.89 
The community must be assured that under the environmental approvals system, Australia’s 
unique environment and heritage values will be maintained or enhanced. This can be achieved 
while reducing regulatory duplication between the Commonwealth and state governments and 
enhancing the competitiveness of project proponents.  
Evidence 
Recent research suggests that the efficiency of Australia’s regulatory approvals process is not 
world standard. A recent report commissioned by the Minerals Council of Australia noted that the 
average Australian thermal coal project experiences an additional 1.3 years of delay relative to 
those elsewhere.90  
Competitor countries are moving to further reduce the time taken to deliver environmental 
approvals. Canada, for example, has introduced statutory time limits for environmental approvals 
and made provisions for accrediting provincial governments’ approvals as part of this process.  
The costs and delays associated with environmental impact assessment and approval are 
significant. An Australian National University study estimated a direct costs to all industries of up to 
$820 million over the life of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
(EPBC Act).91 A significant part of this cost is the result of double-handling between the state and 
Commonwealth Governments. The referrals process under the EPBC Act is resource and cost-
intensive, with referrals ranging from $30,000 to $100,000.92 
The BCA has previously cited the example of one BCA member company93 that completed an 
environmental assessment process that took more than two years, involved more than 4,000 
meetings, briefings and presentations across interest groups, and resulted in a 12,000-page report. 
When approved, more than 1,500 conditions – 1,200 from the state and 300 from the 
Commonwealth – were imposed. These conditions have a further 8,000 sub-conditions attached to 
 
88. ABS, Private New Capital Expenditure and Expected Expenditure, March 2013, cat. no. 5625.0, May 2013. 
89. Deloitte Access Economics, Investment Monitor September 2013, p. 1. 
90. Minerals Council of Australia, Opportunity at Risk: Regaining our Competitive Edge in Minerals Resources, 2012, p. 13. 
91. A. Macintosh, ‘The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth): An Evaluation of 
Its Cost-Effectiveness’, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 26, 2009, p. 337; and A. Macintosh, 
The EPBC Act Survey Project: Preliminary Data Report, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, 
Australian National University, 2009. 
92. Productivity Commission, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation: Planning, Zoning 
and Development Assessments, Melbourne, 2011. 
93. Business Council of Australia, Discussion Paper for the COAG Business Advisory Forum, Melbourne, 2012. 
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them. In total, the company invested more than $25 million in the environmental impact 
assessment. 
Recent reform progress 
Recent amendments to the EPBC Act have created a new matter of national environmental 
significance (MNES) in relation to the significant impacts or likely significant impacts of coal seam 
gas development and large coal mining development on a water resource (the ‘water trigger’). This 
means in effect that any coal seam gas or coal mining development, irrespective of size, will 
require federal government assessment and approval.  
The Australian and Queensland Governments have recently signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding to establish a one-stop-shop for environmental approvals by way of accreditation 
under the EPBC Act. This is an encouraging step towards removing double handling between the 
Commonwealth and states. Other state governments should look to negotiate similar agreements 
with the Commonwealth with urgency.  
Corporate governance regulation 
Rationale 
Having an effective corporate governance framework is an important driver of company 
performance through its effects on entrepreneurialism, innovation, development, accountability and 
risk management. 
The level of corporate governance red tape has increased significantly in recent years as the 
regulatory approach shifts from a performance to conformance-based approach.94 This has been 
evident in recent approaches to executive remuneration, regulation of fraudulent phoenix company 
activity and gender equity reporting. 
With this approach comes an increasing likelihood that corporate governance requirements 
become an impediment to better company performance by diverting the attention of boards and 
executives from their core business. 
Recent changes to regulation of executive remuneration are illustrative of this. While improving 
levels of shareholder engagement on remuneration issues, in some instances the laws have 
resulted in an over-emphasis on remuneration issues and have detracted focus from a range of 
other issues critical to shareholder value. The laws have also provided a vehicle for some groups to 
protest against a company on social and environmental issues unrelated to remuneration.  
An Australian Institute of Company Directors survey found that almost 50 per cent of directors now 
listed the remuneration report as amongst the most time consuming disclosures for boards.95 This 
is despite the fact that less than 10 per cent of those surveyed felt that it should consume the 
majority of the board’s time and focus.96 
Evidence 
The Corporations Act currently runs to more than 2,500 pages, reflecting the expanding and 
ungainly nature of Australia’s corporate regulations. 
This is well acknowledged by both business and corporate law experts. For example, 
Associate Professor Cally Jordan from the University of Melbourne argues that: 
There is no dispute. The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’) is unlovely and unloved. 
Complex, ungainly, badly drafted, internally inconsistent and conceptually troubled; it is a mishmash of 
old law, ad hoc amendments, provisions pulled willy-nilly from different legal systems, statements which 
are not law at all, ideological posturing, and drafting styles that swing wildly from the colloquial to the 
 
94. F. Hilmer, ‘What’s Wrong with Microeconomic Reform Today?’, Presentation to the Sydney Institute, 31 August 2010. 
95. Australian Institute of Company Directors, Member Survey, November 2012. 
96. ibid. 
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technical ... Despite massive efforts at law reform in the last 15 years, and continuous tweaking, the 
Corporations Act remains, as Sir Anthony Mason found it, ‘indigestible and incomprehensible.’97 
There are a range of other regulations that impact the corporate governance environment in 
Australia – for example, even after recent COAG reforms to Directors Liabilities take full effect 
there will still be well over 2,500 offences that directors could face under liability provisions.98 
The extensive regulatory regime comes in spite of Australia being a relatively high performer in 
corporative governance – for example, the World Economic Forum places Australia seventh out of 
148 countries for the efficacy of our corporate boards.99 
 
Recent reform progress 
Recent reform efforts in this area have been heavily focused on increasing regulatory 
requirements, and have come in waves without considering the cumulative impact on companies or 
other areas of corporate regulation that could be streamlined. 
Reform efforts focused on streamlining corporate governance requirements have also been patchy. 
For example in the areas of directors’ liabilities, states such as New South Wales have reduced the 
number of offences faced by directors from over 1,000 to 144.100 On the other hand, states such as 
Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania are not even in a position to accurately quantify 
the number of offences that currently apply to directors in their legislation.101 
Next steps 
While the government should seek to take a broader view of the cumulative cost impact of the 
corporate governance regulatory environment with a view to streamlining requirements, there is 
 
97. C. Jordan, ‘Unlovely and Unloved: Corporate Law Reform’s Progeny’, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 33, 2009, 
p. 627. 
98. BCA calculation based on COAG Reform Council, Seamless National Economy: Report on Performance 2011–12, 
December 2012, p. 90. 
99. World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–14, p.111. 
100. ibid. 
101. ibid. 
Exhibit 12: Minority shareholder rights gone too far? 
Current provisions under section 249D of the Corporations Act allow just 100 shareholders to 
require that directors convene an extraordinary general meeting (EGM). 
To illustrate the incredibly small minority of shareholders that can demand an EGM 
regardless of the genuine urgency of their issues, it is useful to consider how the 100 
member rule would apply to a handful of major Australian companies. For example, this 
would represent: 
• Less than 0.03 per cent of all Woolworths shareholders. 
• Approximately 0.0125 per cent of all Commonwealth Bank shareholders. 
• Approximately 0.007 per cent of all Telstra shareholders. 
The conduct of EGMs to consider matters that can be properly addressed at AGMs 
consumes considerable unnecessary resources and diverts management from the day to day 
operations of the company. EGMs for large listed companies can cost up to $1 million.  
Flaws in this current threshold have been widely recognised and amendment of this provision 
is well overdue. For example, in 1999 the Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on 
Corporations and Securities concluded that “the present provision for 100 members to 
requisition a meeting of the company is inappropriate and open to abuse”. 
Source: Report on Matters Arising from the Company Law Review Act 1998, October 1999, para 15.16. 
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also a case for hastening slowly so as not to increase uncertainty for firms. Making dramatic 
changes to corporate governance regulations in a short period of time would bring with it major 
transitional costs and could have unintended consequences.  
On this basis, a useful first step may be for the government to commission a study to ascertain the 
cumulative compliance burden of corporate governance regulation in Australia. This would provide 
policymakers with a better understanding of the existing regulatory burden from corporate 
governance regulation before introducing new requirements. It would also provide a basis for 
understanding which areas of regulation are the most costly and identifying the greatest 
opportunities for streamlining. 
 
Workplace relations regulation 
Rationale 
Improvements in productivity and competitiveness improvements are likely to flow from working 
smarter, not harder, by being innovative in product and service design, by adopting new 
technologies, work processes and supply chains – changing what businesses do and how they 
do it. 
Industrial relations regulations have a rightful role to play in addressing legitimate community 
concerns about workers’ basic rights. But equally they have to preserve the ability of businesses to 
engage effectively with their employees to change work arrangements in response to commercial 
imperatives and achieve improvements in competitiveness that are critical to the sustainability of 
companies and their workforces. 
Evidence 
The Productivity Commission has outlined how flexible workplace arrangements enable firms to 
adapt more readily to changing circumstances, for example to meet changes in demand by: 
• Adjusting the workforce size either through engaging or dismissing employees, the short-term 
use of casuals or contracting out of functions traditionally performed in-house. 
• Varying the scheduling and intensity of use of the existing workforce – strategies include flexible 
rostering for overtime and shift work and scheduling rostered-days-off and annual leave to 
coincide with low demand. 
• Moving labour between functional areas – this strategy requires that workers have both the skills 
and willingness to move between tasks and requires the removal or reduction of any barriers that 
may exist. 
• Linking remuneration and therefore unit labour costs, to product demand and output rather than 
hours worked – approaches include sales commissions or incentives and bonus or profit sharing 
schemes. 
One way to enable firms to adapt in this way is to create the institutional, policy and regulatory 
environment in which businesses can respond effectively to competitive pressures. This should 
involve regulation that supports direct engagement between employers and employees at the 
enterprise level, reduces unnecessary uncertainty and risk, removes barriers to job creation, 
creates incentives for collaboration and minimises industrial conflict and delivers fair remuneration 
outcomes that reward effort. 
Companies have identified provisions in the current legislative framework which are being used, 
frequently in combination, to undermine competitiveness, impede productivity and job creation, and 
add unnecessary delays and costs to doing business. 
Recommendation 10: The government should commission a study to quantify the 
cumulative compliance burden of corporate governance regulation in Australia. 
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Recent reform progress 
The previous government’s amendments to the Fair Work Act 2009 fail to address the core issues 
that need to be resolved in order to enhance productivity and competitiveness so as to provide an 
environment where employers can grow their business and provide additional employment 
opportunities.  
The amendments in no way address the core issues raised by the business in submissions to the 
review of the Fair Work Act in 2012. Indeed, several of the amendments fall outside the 
consideration and recommendations of the panel who undertook the review.  
Next steps 
The BCA considers that it is inevitable that the workplace regulatory framework will need to change 
substantially to cope with an increasingly competitive global landscape, rapid technological 
developments, changing consumer demand and an ageing workforce. In the longer term this 
requires a fundamental rethink of the regulatory framework that will be most conducive to 
productive workplaces, in light of these trends. 
In the shorter term, the government should pursue a number of immediate changes to the Fair 
Work Act that aim to foster greater flexibility and innovation and constrain business costs. 
 
  
Recommendation 11: The government should pursue a number of immediate changes to 
the Fair Work Act to foster greater flexibility and innovation and constrain business costs. 
These changes would include: 
• reducing the range of matters that can be bargained over 
• providing access to employer-only greenfield agreements 
• enhancing the capacity to agree flexibility arrangements with employees including through 
individual flexibility arrangements 
• reducing the scope of the adverse actions provisions 
• limiting access to protected industrial action where there has been unreasonable or 
capricious use of such action 
• limiting union entry rights to employer premises 
• making unlawful clauses which exclude the engagement of contractors or labour hire 
companies 
• modifying the “better off overall test” to provide for a broadening of matters that may be 
taken into account in the application of the test 
• modifying provisions relating to majority support determinations 
• amending the transfer of business arrangements to include a sunset clause after twelve 
months. 
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GLOSSARY 
AAT   Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
ACCC   Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
AEMC   Australian Energy Market Commission 
AEMO   Australian Energy Market Operator 
AER   Australian Energy Regulator 
ANAO    Australian National Audit Office 
APRA   Australian Prudential Regulation Authority  
ASIC   Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
ASX   Australian Securities Exchange 
ATO   Australian Taxation Office 
CCA    Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
COAG   Council of Australian Governments 
EPBC Act  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
ICN   International Competition Network 
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
MNES   Matter of National Environmental Significance 
OBPR   Office of Best Practice Regulation 
RIA   Regulatory/Regulation Impact Analysis  
RIS   Regulation Impact Statement 
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